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Abstract
The finite state Markov channel (FSMC), where the channel transition probability is controlled by a state
undergoing a Markov process, is a useful model for the mobile wireless communication channel. In this paper,
we investigate the security issue in the mobile wireless communication systems by considering the FSMC with an
eavesdropper, which we call the finite state Markov wiretap channel (FSM-WC). We assume that the state is perfectly
known by the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, and through a noiseless feedback channel, the legitimate
receiver sends his received channel output and the state back to the transmitter after some time delay. Inner and
outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation regions of the FSM-WC with delayed state feedback and with or without
delayed channel output feedback are provided in this paper, and we show that these bounds meet if the eavesdropper’s
received symbol is a degraded version of the legitimate receiver’s. The above results are further explained via degraded
Gaussian and Gaussian fading examples.
Index Terms
Capacity-equivocation region, delayed feedback, finite-state Markov channel, secrecy capacity, wiretap channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The finite state Markov channel
The finite state Markov channel (FSMC) is a discrete channel, and its transition probability depends on a channel
state which takes values in a finite set and undergoes a Markov process. Wang et al. [1] and Zhang et al. [2] first
found that the FSMC is a useful model for characterizing the time-varying fading channels, and the capacity of the
FSMC was studied by [3]. Here note that the capacity provided in [3] is a multi-letter characterization, and it is
difficult to calculate. A single-letter characterization of the capacity of the FSMC remains open.
It is known to all that for a point-to-point discrete memoryless channel (DMC), feeding back the channel output
of the receiver to the transmitter via another noiseless channel does not increase the channel capacity [4]. However,
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2Cover et al. showed that the capacity regions of several multi-user channels, such as multiple-access channel (MAC)
and relay channel, can be enhanced by feeding back the receiver’s channel output to the transmitter over a noiseless
channel, see [5] and [6]. Then, it is natural to ask: does the receiver’s channel output feedback help to enhance
the capacity of the FSMC? Viswanathan [7] answered this question by considering a practical mobile wireless
communication scenario, where the channel state is perfectly obtained by the receiver, and the receiver noiselessly
feeds back the state and his own channel output to the transmitter after some time delay. Viswanathan [7] showed
that this communication scenario can be modeled as the FSMC with delayed feedback, see Figure 1. The capacity
of the model of Figure 1 is totally determined in [7], and unlike the works of [5] and [6], the capacity results
in [7] imply that feeding back the receiver’s channel output to the transmitter over a noiseless channel does not
increase the capacity of FSMC with only delayed state feedback. Other related works on the FSMC with or without
feedback are investigated in [8]-[13].
Fig. 1: The FSMC with delayed feedback
B. The wiretap channel
Wyner, in his landmark paper on the wiretap channel [14], first investigated the information-theoretic security
in practical communication systems. In Wyner’s wiretap channel model, a transmitter sends a private message
to a legitimate receiver via a discrete memoryless main channel, and an eavesdropper eavesdrops the output of
the main channel via a discrete memoryless wiretap channel. We say that the perfect secrecy is achieved if no
information about the private message is leaked to the eavesdropper. The secrecy capacity, which is the maximum
reliable transmission rate with perfect secrecy constraint, was characterized by Wyner [14]. After Wyner determined
the secrecy capacity of the discrete memoryless wiretap channel model, Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman [15]
investigated the Gaussian wiretap channel (GWC), where the noise of the main channel and the wiretap channel
is Gaussian distributed. It is shown in [15] that the secrecy capacity of the GWC is obtained by subtracting the
capacity of the overall wiretap channel 1 from the capacity of the main channel. Wyner’s work was generalized
by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [16], where common and private messages are sent through a discrete memoryless general
1Here the overall wiretap channel is a cascade of the main channel and the wiretap channel
3broadcast channel 2. The common message is assumed to be decoded correctly by both the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropper, while the private message is only allowed to be obtained by the legitimate receiver. The secrecy
capacity region of this generalized model was characterized in [16], and later, Liang et al. [17] characterized the
secrecy capacity region for the Gaussian case of Csisza´r and Ko¨rner’s model [16]. The work of [14] and [16]
lays the foundation of the information-theoretic security in communication systems. Using the approach of [14]
and [16], the security problems in multi-user communication channels, such as broadcast channel, multiple-access
channel, relay channel, and interference channel, have been widely studied, see [18]-[33].
Recently, the wiretap channel with states has received much attention, see [34]-[38]. These works focus on the
scenario that the states are identical independent distributed (i.i.d.), and to the best of the authors’ knowledge, only
Bloch et al. [39] and Sankarasubramaniam et al. [40] investigated the wiretap channel with memory states, where a
stochastic algorithm for computing the multi-letter form secrecy capacity of this model was provided. A single-letter
characterization for the secrecy capacity of [39] and [40] is still open.
C. Contributions of This Paper and Organization
In practical mobile wireless communication networks, security is a critical issue when people intend to transmit
private information, such as the credit card transactions and the banking related data communications. The secure
transmission of these private messages in the practical mobile wireless communication networks motivates us to
study the finite-state Markov wiretap channel with delayed feedback, see the following Figure 2. In Figure 2, the
transition probability of the channel at each time instant depends on a state which undergoes a finite-state Markov
process. At time i, the receiver 3 receives the channel output Yi and the state Si, and sends them back to the
transmitter after a delay time d via a noiseless feedback channel. The channel encoder, at time i, generates the
channel input according to the transmitted message W and the delayed feedback Yi−d and Si−d. Moreover, at time
i, an eavesdropper receives the channel output Zi and the state Si, and he wishes to obtain the transmitted message
W . The delay time d is perfectly known by the receiver, the eavesdropper and the transmitter. The main results of
the model of Figure 2 are listed as follows.
• First, for the model of Figure 2 with only delayed state Si−d feedback, we provide inner and outer bounds on
the capacity-equivocation region, and we find that these bounds meet if the eavesdropper’s received symbol
Zi is a degraded version of the receiver’s Yi.
• Second, inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region are provided for the model of Figure 2
with both delayed state Si−d and delayed output Yi−d feedback. We also find that these bounds meet if Zi is a
degraded version of Yi. Moreover, unlike the fact that the delayed receiver’s channel output feedback does not
increase the capacity of the FSMC with only delayed state feedback [7], we find that for the degraded case,
this delayed channel output feedback Yi−d helps to enhance the capacity-equivocation region of the FSM-WC
2Here note that Wyner’s wiretap channel model is a kind of degraded broadcast channel
3Throughout this paper, the “receiver” is used as a shorthand for “legitimate receiver”
4with only delayed state feedback, i.e., sending back the receiver’s channel output to the transmitter may help
to enhance the security of the practical mobile wireless communication systems.
• The above results are further explained via degraded Gaussian and Gaussian fading examples.
Fig. 2: The FSM-WC with delayed feedback
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we show the definitions, notations and the main
results of the model of Figure 2. Degraded Gaussian and Gaussian fading examples of the model of Figure 2 are
provided in Section III. Final conclusions are presented in Section IV.
II. BASIC NOTATIONS, DEFINITIONS AND THE MAIN RESULT OF THE MODEL OF FIGURE 2
Basic notations: We use the notation pV (v) to denote the probability mass function Pr{V = v}, where V (capital
letter) denotes the random variable, v (lower case letter) denotes the real value of the random variable V . Denote
the alphabet in which the random variable V takes values by V (calligraphic letter). Similarly, let UN be a random
vector (U1, ..., UN ), and uN be a vector value (u1, ..., uN ). In the rest of this paper, the log function is taken to
the base 2.
Definitions of the model of Figure 2:
• The channel is a finite-state Markov channel (FSMC), where the channel state S takes values in a finite alphabet
S = {s1, s2, ..., sk}. At the i-th time (1 ≤ i ≤ N ), the transition probability of the channel depends on the
state si, the input xi and the outputs yi, zi, and is given by PY,Z|X,S(yi, zi|xi, si). The i-th time outputs of
the channel Yi and Zi are assumed to depend only on Xi and Si, and thus we have
PY N ,ZN |XN ,SN (y
N , zN |xN , sN ) =
N∏
i=1
PY,Z|X,S(yi, zi|xi, si). (2.1)
• The state process {Si} is assumed to be a stationary irreducible aperiodic ergodic Markov chain. The state
process is independent of the transmitted messages, and it is independent of the channel input and outputs
given the previous states, i.e.,
Pr{Si = si|Xi = xi, Y i = yi, Si−1 = si−1} = Pr{Si = si|Si−1 = si−1}. (2.2)
5Here note that (2.2) also implies that
Pr{Si = si|Xi = xi, Y i = yi, Si−d = si−d} = Pr{Si = si|Si−d = si−d}, (2.3)
where 1 ≤ d ≤ i − 1. Denote the 1-step transition probability matrix by K, and denote the steady state
probability of {Si} by pi. Let the random variables Si and Si−d be the channel states at time i and i − d,
respectively. The joint distribution of (Si, Si−d) is given by
pid(Si = sl, Si−d = sj) = pi(sj)Kd(sj , sl), (2.4)
where sl is the l-th element of S, sj is the j-th element of S, and Kd(sj , sl) is the (j, l)-th element of the
d-step transition probability matrix Kd of the Markov process.
• Let W , uniformly distributed over the finite alphabetW = {1, 2, ...,M}, be the message sent by the transmitter.
Here note that W is independent of the state process {Si} (1 ≤ i ≤ N ) and H(W ) = logM . For the model
of Figure 2 without receiver’s channel output feedback, the i-th time channel input Xi is given by
Xi =
 fi(W ), 1 ≤ i ≤ dfi(W,Si−d), d+ 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (2.5)
and for the model of Figure 2 with receiver’s channel output feedback, Xi is given by
Xi =
 fi(W ), 1 ≤ i ≤ dfi(W,Si−d, Y i−d), d+ 1 ≤ i ≤ N. (2.6)
Here note that the i-th time channel encoder fi is a stochastic encoder.
• The channel decoder is a mapping
ψ : YN × SN → {1, 2, ...,M}, (2.7)
with inputs Y N , SN and output Wˆ . The average probability of error Pe is denoted by
Pe =
1
M
M∑
j=1
∑
sN
PSN (s
n)Pr{ψ(yN , sN ) 6= j|j was sent}. (2.8)
• Since the state is also known by the eavesdropper, the eavesdropper’s equivocation to the message W is defined
as
∆ =
1
N
H(W |ZN , SN ). (2.9)
• A rate-equivocation pair (R,Re) (where R,Re > 0) is called achievable if, for any  > 0, there exists a
channel encoder-decoder (N,∆, Pe) such that
logM
N
≥ R− , ∆ ≥ Re − , Pe ≤ . (2.10)
The capacity-equivocation region is a set composed of all achievable (R,Re) pairs. Here the capacity-equivocation
region of the model of Figure 2 with only delayed state feedback is denoted by R, and Rf denotes the capacity-
equivocation region of the model of Figure 2 with delayed state and receiver’s channel output feedback. In the
6remainder of this section, the bounds on the capacity-equivocation region R are given in Theorem 1 and Theorem
2, and the bounds on Rf are given in Theorem 3 and Theorem 4, see the followings.
Main results on R:
Theorem 1: An inner bound Rin on R is given by
Rin = {(R,Re) : 0 ≤ Re ≤ R,
R ≤ I(V ;Y |S, S˜),
Re ≤ I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜)},
where the joint probability PUV SS˜XY Z(u, v, s, s˜, x, y, z) satisfies
PUV SS˜XY Z(u, v, s, s˜, x, y, z)
= PY Z|XS(y, z|x, s)PX|UV S˜(x|u, v, s˜)PV |US˜(v|u, s˜) ·
PU |S˜(u|s˜)Kd(s˜, s)PS˜(s˜), (2.11)
and U may be assumed to be a (deterministic) function of V . Here note that in Rin, if I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜) −
I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜) < 0, Re = 0.
Proof: The inner bound Rin is achieved by the following key steps:
• First, combining the rate splitting technique used in [16] with the multiplexing coding scheme used in [7],
we divide the transmitted message W into a common message Wc = (Wc,1, ...,Wc,k) and a confidential
message Wp = (Wp,1, ...,Wp,k), where k is the cardinality of S, and Wc,s˜ (or Wp,s˜) (1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k) is the s˜-th
sub-message of Wc (or Wp). Further divide the sub-message Wp,s˜ into two part, i.e., Wp,s˜ = (Wp,s˜,1,Wp,s˜,2).
Here note that the index s˜ is the specific value of the delayed state Si−d, which is represented by S˜.
• Similar to the superposition coding strategy used in [16], the sub-message Wc,s˜ (1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k) is encoded as
the cloud center UNs˜ (here Ns˜ is the codeword length for Wc,s˜ and Wp,s˜), and the message pair (Wc,s˜,Wp,s˜)
is encoded as the satellite codeword V Ns˜ . Here note that the random binning coding strategy used in [16] is
also introduced into the construction of V Ns˜ , i.e., there are three indexes in V Ns˜ , the first index is chosen
according to the common message Wc,s˜, the second index is chosen according to Wp,s˜,1, and the third index
is randomly chosen from a bin with index Wp,s˜,2.
• Note that the state S and the delayed state Si−d (represented by S˜) are known by all parties. Then along the
lines of the proof of [16], for the sub-messages Wc,s˜ and Wp,s˜, we can obtain the following region Rins˜
Rins˜ = {(Rs˜, Re,s˜) : 0 ≤ Rs˜ = Rc,s˜ +Rp,s˜,
0 ≤ Rc,s˜ ≤ min{I(U ;Y |S, S˜ = s˜), I(U ;Z|S, S˜ = s˜)},
0 ≤ Rp,s˜ ≤ I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ = s˜),
0 ≤ Re,s˜ ≤ Rp,s˜,
Re,s˜ ≤ I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ = s˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜ = s˜)},
7where Rc,s˜, Rp,s˜ and Rs˜ are the rates of the sub-messages Wc,s˜ , Wp,s˜ and Ws˜ = (Wc,s˜,Wp,s˜), respectively,
and Re,s˜ is the equivocation rate of the sub-message Wp,s˜. Here note that in Rins˜ , if I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ =
s˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜ = s˜) < 0, Re,s˜ = 0.
• Finally, using Fourier-Motzkin elimination (see e.g., [43]) to eliminate Rc,s˜ and Rp,s˜ from Rins˜ , and multi-
plexing all the sub-messages, the region Rin is obtained.
The details of the proof are in Appendix A.
Theorem 2: An outer bound Rout on R is given by
Rout = {(R,Re) : 0 ≤ Re ≤ R,
R ≤ I(V ;Y |S, S˜),
Re ≤ I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜)},
where the joint probability PUV SS˜XY Z(u, v, s, s˜, x, y, z) satisfies
PUV SS˜XY Z(u, v, s, s˜, x, y, z)
= PY Z|XS(y, z|x, s)PXV USS˜(x, v, u, s, s˜). (2.12)
Here note that in Rout, if I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜) < 0, Re = 0.
Proof: The outer bound Rout is achieved by the following key steps:
• First, note that the auxiliary random variable Ui in [16] is defined as (Y i−1, ZNi+1). In this paper, in order to
introduce the delayed feedback state Si−d into the definition of Ui, we define Ui , (Y i−1, ZNi+1, SN ). Here
note that Si−d is included in the SN .
• Using Fano’s inequality, the transmission rate R and the equivocation rate Re can be upper bounded by
1
N I(W ;Y
N |SN ) and 1N (I(W ;Y N |SN )− I(W ;ZN |SN )), respectively.
• Then, using chain rule and the following Csisza´r’s equalities
N∑
i=1
I(Yi;Z
N
i+1|Y i−1, SN ) =
N∑
i=1
I(Zi;Y
i−1|ZNi+1, SN ) (2.13)
and
N∑
i=1
I(Yi;Z
N
i+1|Y i−1, SN ,W ) =
N∑
i=1
I(Zi;Y
i−1|ZNi+1, SN ,W ), (2.14)
to eliminate some identities of the bound on the equivocation rate Re, the outer bound Rout is obtained.
The details of the proof are in Appendix B.
Remark 1: There are some notes on Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, see the followings.
• Here note that the inner bound Rin is almost the same as the outer bound Rout, except the definitions of
the joint probability PUV SS˜XY Z(u, v, s, s˜, x, y, z) in Rin and Rout. To be specific, in Rin, the definition
of PUV SS˜XY Z(u, v, s, s˜, x, y, z) implies the Markov chains S → (S˜, U, V ) → X , S → (S˜, U) → V and
S → S˜ → U , but these chains are not guaranteed in Rout.
8• If the eavesdropper’s received symbol ZN is a degraded version of Y N , i.e., the Markov chain (XN , SN )→
Y N → ZN holds, the outer bound Rout meets with the inner bound Rin, and they reduce to the following
region R∗, where
R∗ = {(R,Re) : Re ≤ R,
R ≤ I(X;Y |S, S˜),
Re ≤ I(X;Y |S, S˜)− I(X;Z|S, S˜)}, (2.15)
and the joint probability PSS˜XY Z(ss˜xyz) satisfies
PSS˜XY Z(ss˜xyz) = PZ|Y (z|y)PY |X,S(y|x, s)Kd(s˜, s)PX|S˜(x|s˜)PS˜(s˜). (2.16)
Proof: See Appendix C.
• A rate R is called achievable with weak secrecy if, for any  > 0, there exists a channel encoder-decoder
(N,∆, Pe) such that
logM
N
≥ R− , ∆ ≥ R− , Pe ≤ . (2.17)
The secrecy capacity is the maximum achievable rate with weak secrecy, and it can be directly obtained by
substituting Re = R into the corresponding capacity-equivocation region and maximizing R. Thus, for the
degraded case of the model of Figure 2 with only delayed state feedback, the secrecy capacity C∗s is given by
C∗s = max
PX|S˜(x|s˜)
(I(X;Y |S, S˜)− I(X;Z|S, S˜)). (2.18)
Here C∗s is obtained by substituting Re = R into (2.15) and maximizing R.
Main results on Rf :
Theorem 3: An inner bound Rfi on the capacity-equivocation region Rf is given by
Rfi = {(R,Re) : 0 ≤ Re ≤ R,
R ≤ I(V ;Y |S, S˜),
Re ≤ [I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜)]+ +H(Y |V,Z, S, S˜)},
where [x]+ = x if x > 0, [x]+ = 0 if x ≤ 0, the joint probability mass function PUV SS˜XY Z(u, v, s, s˜, x, y, z)
satisfies
PUV SS˜XY Z(u, v, s, s˜, x, y, z)
= PY Z|XS(y, z|x, s)PX|UV S˜(x|u, v, s˜)PV |US˜(v|u, s˜) ·
PU |S˜(u|s˜)Kd(s˜, s)PS˜(s˜), (2.19)
and U may be assumed to be a (deterministic) function of V .
Proof:
9The output feedback inner bound Rfi is constructed according to the inner bound Rin in Theorem 1, and it is
achieved by the following key steps:
• Similar to the construction of the bound Rin, we split W into Wc and Wp, and define Wc = (Wc,1, ...,Wc,k)
and Wp = (Wp,1, ...,Wp,k). Furthermore, for 1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k, define Wp,s˜ = (Wp,s˜,1,Wp,s˜,2). The index s˜ is the
specific value of the delayed state Si−d, which is represented by S˜.
• The component message Wc,s˜ (1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k) is encoded as UNs˜ (Ns˜ is the codeword length for Wc,s˜ and
Wp,s˜). The component message pair (Wc,s˜,Wp,s˜) and a secret key generated by the delayed output feedback
are encoded as V Ns˜ . To be specific, the delayed output feedback is used to generate a secret key K∗ which
is shared between the receiver and the transmitter, and this key is used to encrypt Wp,s˜,2 (part of the Wp,s˜),
i.e., Wp,s˜,2 is encrypted as Wp,s˜,2⊕K∗. Then, the indexes of V Ns˜ is chosen as follows. The first and second
indexes are chosen from Wc,s˜ and Wp,s˜,1, respectively. The third index is randomly chosen from a bin with
index Wp,s˜,2 ⊕K∗.
• Comparing the above code construction of Rfi with that of Rin, we see that the encoding and decoding
schemes of these two bounds are almost the same, except that the bin index of V Ns˜ is encrypted by K∗. Thus,
we can conclude that for the sub-messages Wc,s˜ and Wp,s˜, the bound Rfis˜ is almost the same as Rins˜ , except
that the equivocation rate Re,s˜ of Rfis˜ is bounded by the sum of two part, see the followings.
– The first part is the upper bound on Re,s˜ of Rins˜ . Here note that in Rins˜ , the bounds Re,s˜ ≥ 0 and
Re,s˜ ≤ I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ = s˜)−I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜ = s˜) imply that Re,s˜ is upper bounded by [I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ =
s˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜ = s˜)]+.
– The second part is the upper bound on the rate of the secret key K∗. Using the balanced coloring lemma
introduced by Ahlswede and Cai [42], we conclude that the rate of the secret key K∗ is bounded by
H(Y |V,Z, S, S˜ = s˜).
Thus, the Re,s˜ of Rfis˜ is upper bounded by [I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ = s˜)−I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜ = s˜)]++H(Y |V,Z, S, S˜ =
s˜). Finally, using Fourier-Motzkin elimination to eliminate Rc,s˜ and Rp,s˜ from Rfis˜ , and multiplexing all the
sub-messages, the region Rfi is obtained.
The details of the proof are in Appendix D.
Theorem 4: An outer bound Rfo on the capacity-equivocation region Rf is given by
Rfo = {(R,Re) : 0 ≤ Re ≤ R,
R ≤ I(V ;Y |S, S˜),
Re ≤ H(Y |Z,U, S, S˜)},
where the joint probability mass function PUV SS˜XY Z(u, v, s, s˜, x, y, z) satisfies
PUV SS˜XY Z(u, v, s, s˜, x, y, z) = PY Z|XS(y, z|x, s)PXV USS˜(x, v, u, s, s˜), (2.20)
and U may be assumed to be a (deterministic) function of V .
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Proof: The derivation of Rfo is almost the same as that of Rout, except the bound on Re, and it is achieved
by the following two steps. First, by using Fano’s inequality, the equivocation rate Re can be upper bounded by
1
NH(Y
N |ZN , SN ). Then, using chain rule and the auxiliary random variables defined in the proof of Theorem 2,
the outer bound Rfo is obtained. The details of the proof are in Appendix E.
Remark 2: There are some notes on Theorem 3 and Theorem 4, see the followings.
• Since the delayed receiver’s channel output feedback is not known by the eavesdropper, it can be used to
generate a secret key shared only between the receiver and the transmitter. Comparing Rfi with Rin, it is
easy to see that this secret key helps to enhance the achievable rate-equivocation region of the FSM-WC with
only delayed state feedback. Here note that the delayed state is also shared by the receiver and the transmitter,
but it is known by the eavesdropper, and thus we can not use it to generate a secret key.
• If the eavesdropper’s received symbol ZN is a degraded version of Y N , i.e., the Markov chain (XN , SN )→
Y N → ZN holds, the outer bound Rfo meets with the inner bound Rfi, and they reduce to the following
region Rf∗, where
Rf∗ = {(R,Re) : Re ≤ R,
R ≤ I(X;Y |S, S˜),
Re ≤ H(Y |Z, S, S˜)}, (2.21)
and the joint probability PSS˜XY Z(ss˜xyz) satisfies
PSS˜XY Z(ss˜xyz) = PZ|Y (z|y)PY |X,S(y|x, s)Kd(s˜, s)PX|S˜(x|s˜)PS˜(s˜). (2.22)
Proof: See Appendix F.
• For the degraded case of the model of Figure 2 with delayed state and receiver’s channel output feedback, the
secrecy capacity C∗fs can be directly obtained from the above Rf∗, and it is given by
C∗fs = max
PX|S˜(x|s˜)
min{I(X;Y |S, S˜), H(Y |Z, S, S˜)}. (2.23)
Note that (2.23) can also be re-written as
C∗fs = max
PX|S˜(x|s˜)
min{I(X;Y |S, S˜), I(X;Y |S, S˜)− I(X;Z|S, S˜) +H(Y |X,Z, S, S˜)}, (2.24)
and this is because
I(X;Y |S, S˜)− I(X;Z|S, S˜) +H(Y |X,Z, S, S˜) = −H(X|S, S˜, Y ) +H(X|S, S˜, Z) +H(Y |X,Z, S, S˜)
(1)
= −H(X|S, S˜, Y, Z) +H(X|S, S˜, Z) +H(Y |X,Z, S, S˜)
= I(X;Y |S, S˜, Z) +H(Y |X,Z, S, S˜)
= H(Y |S, S˜, Z), (2.25)
11
where (1) is from the Markov chain X → (S, S˜, Y )→ Z. Comparing (2.24) with (2.18), it is easy to see that
the delayed receiver’s channel output feedback helps to enhance the secrecy capacity of the degraded FSM-WC
with only delayed state feedback.
III. SECRECY CAPACITIES FOR TWO SPECIAL CASES OF THE MODEL OF FIGURE 2
A. Secrecy Capacity for the Degraded Gaussian Case of the model of Figure 2 with or without Delayed Receiver’s
Channel Output Feedback
In this subsection, we compute the secrecy capacities for the degraded Gaussian case of Figure 2 with or without
delayed receiver’s channel output feedback, and investigate how this delayed feedback and channel memory affect
the secrecy capacities. At the i-th time (1 ≤ i ≤ N ), the inputs and outputs of the channel satisfy
Yi = Xi +NSi , Zi = Yi +Nw,i. (3.26)
Here note that NSi is Gaussian distributed with zero mean, and the variance depends on the i-th time state Si = si
(denoted by σ2si ). The random variable Nw,i (1 ≤ i ≤ N ) is also Gaussian distributed with zero mean and constant
variance σ2w (Nw,i ∼ N (0, σ2w) for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}). At time i, the receiver has access to the state Si and the
output Yi. The state Si is fed back to the transmitter through a noiseless feedback channel with a delay time d. The
state undergoes a Markov process with steady probability distribution pi(s) and 1-step transition probability matrix
K. The power constraint of the transmitter is given by∑
s˜
pi(s˜)EPX|S˜(x|s˜)[X
2|s˜] ≤ P0. (3.27)
Secrecy capacity for the degraded Gaussian case of the model of Figure 2 with only delayed state feedback:
Theorem 5: For the degraded Gaussian case of the model of Figure 2 with only delayed state feedback, the
secrecy capacity C(g)s is given by
C(g)s = maxP(s˜):∑s˜ pi(s˜)P(s˜)≤P0
∑
s˜
∑
s
pi(s˜)Kd(s˜, s)(
1
2
log(1 +
P(s˜)
σ2s
)− 1
2
log(1 +
P(s˜)
σ2s + σ
2
w
)), (3.28)
where P(s˜) is the transmitter’s power for the state s˜, and σ2s is the variance of the noise NS given the state S = s.
Here note that the definition of P(s˜) is the same as that of the finite state additive Gaussian noise channel [7].
Proof:
(Converse part:) Using (2.18), the secrecy capacity C(g)s can be re-written by
C(g)s = max
PX|S˜(x|s˜)
∑
s˜
pi(s˜)
∑
s
Kd(s˜, s)(I(X;Y |S = s, S˜ = s˜)− I(X;Z|S = s, S˜ = s˜)). (3.29)
Letting P(s˜) be the transmitter’s power for the state s˜ satisfying (3.27), and σ2s be the variance of the noise NS
12
given the state S = s, then we have
I(X;Y |S = s, S˜ = s˜)− I(X;Z|S = s, S˜ = s˜)
= h(Y |S = s, S˜ = s˜)− h(Y |X,S = s, S˜ = s˜)− h(Z|S = s, S˜ = s˜) + h(Z|X,S = s, S˜ = s˜)
= h(Xs˜ +Ns)− h(Ns)− h(Xs˜ +Ns +Nw) + h(Ns +Nw)
(a)
≤ h(Xs˜ +Ns)− h(Ns)− 1
2
log(22h(Xs˜+Ns) + 22h(Nw)) + h(Ns +Nw)
(b)
≤ 1
2
log(1 +
P(s˜)
σ2s
)− 1
2
log(1 +
P(s˜)
σ2s + σ
2
w
), (3.30)
where (a) is from the entropy power inequality, (b) is from h(Xs˜+Ns)− 12 log(22h(Xs˜+Ns)+22h(Nw)) is increasing
while h(Xs˜+Ns) is increasing, and the fact that for a given variance, the largest entropy is achieved if the random
variable is Gaussian distributed. Furthermore, the “=” in (a) is achieved if Xs˜ ∼ N (0,P(s˜)) and Xs˜ is independent
of Ns. Applying (3.30) to (3.29), the converse part of Theorem 5 is proved.
(Direct part:) Letting Xs˜ be the random variable X given the delayed state s˜, and substituting Xs˜ ∼ N (0,P(s˜))
and (3.26) into (3.29), the achievability proof of Theorem 5 is along the lines of that of (2.18) (see Appendix C),
and thus we omit the proof here.
The proof of Theorem 5 is completed.
Secrecy capacity for the degraded Gaussian case of the model of Figure 2 with delayed state and receiver’s
channel output feedback:
Theorem 6: For the degraded Gaussian case of the model of Figure 2 with delayed state and receiver’s channel
output feedback, the secrecy capacity C(gf)s is given by
C(gf)s = maxP(s˜):∑s˜ pi(s˜)P(s˜)≤P0
∑
s˜
∑
s
pi(s˜)Kd(s˜, s) min{1
2
log(1 +
P(s˜)
σ2s
),
1
2
log
2pieσ2w(P(s˜) + σ2s)
P(s˜) + σ2s + σ2w
}. (3.31)
Proof: Defining P(s˜) as the transmitter’s power for the state s˜, the secrecy capacity C∗fs in (2.23) can be
re-written as
C∗fs = maxP(s˜):∑s˜ pi(s˜)P(s˜)≤P0
∑
s˜
∑
s
pi(s˜)Kd(s˜, s) min{I(X;Y |S = s, S˜ = s˜), H(Y |Z, S = s, S˜ = s˜)}. (3.32)
(Converse part:) Defining σ2s as the variance of the noise NS given the state S = s, the mutual information
I(X;Y |S = s, S˜ = s˜) in (3.32) can be further bounded by
I(X;Y |S = s, S˜ = s˜) = h(Y |S = s, S˜ = s˜)− h(Y |S = s, S˜ = s˜, X)
≤ h(Xs˜ +Ns)− h(Y |S = s, S˜ = s˜, X)
= h(Xs˜ +Ns)− h(Ns)
(a)
≤ 1
2
log(1 +
P(s˜)
σ2s
), (3.33)
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where (a) is from the fact that for a given variance, the largest entropy is achieved if the random variable is Gaussian
distributed.
Moreover, the differential conditional entropy h(Y |Z, S = s, S˜ = s˜) can be further bounded by
h(Y |Z, S = s, S˜ = s˜) = h(Y, Z, S = s, S˜ = s˜)− h(Z, S = s, S˜ = s˜)
(b)
= h(Z|Y ) + h(Y, S = s, S˜ = s˜)− h(Z, S = s, S˜ = s˜)
= h(Z|Y ) + h(Y |S = s, S˜ = s˜)− h(Z|S = s, S˜ = s˜)
(c)
= h(Nw) + h(Y |S = s, S˜ = s˜)− h(Y +Nw|S = s, S˜ = s˜)
(d)
≤ h(Nw) + h(Y |S = s, S˜ = s˜)− 1
2
log(22h(Y |S=s,S˜=s˜) + 22h(Nw))
=
1
2
log(2pieσ2w) + h(Y |S = s, S˜ = s˜)−
1
2
log(22h(Y |S=s,S˜=s˜) + 2pieσ2w)
(e)
≤ 1
2
log(2pieσ2w) +
1
2
log(2pie(P(s˜) + σ2s))−
1
2
log(2pie(P(s˜) + σ2s + σ2w))
=
1
2
log
2pieσ2w(P(s˜) + σ2s)
P(s˜) + σ2s + σ2w
, (3.34)
where (b) is from the Markov chain (S, S˜) → Y → Z, (c) is from the fact that Z = Y + Nw, (d) is from the
entropy power inequality, and (e) is from the fact that h(Y |S = s, S˜ = s˜) − 12 log(22h(Y |S=s,S˜=s˜) + 2pieσ2w) is
increasing while h(Y |S = s, S˜ = s˜) is increasing, and
h(Y |S = s, S˜ = s˜) ≤ h(Xs˜ +Ns) ≤ 1
2
log(2pie(P(s˜) + σ2s)). (3.35)
Applying (3.33) and (3.34) to (3.32), the converse proof of Theorem 6 is completed.
(Direct part:) Letting Xs˜ be the random variable X given the delayed state s˜, and substituting Xs˜ ∼ N (0,P(s˜))
and (3.26) into (3.32), the achievability proof of Theorem 6 is along the lines of that of Theorem 3, and thus we
omit the details here.
The proof of Theorem 6 is completed.
Numerical results of C(g)s and C(gf)s
In order to gain some intuition on the secrecy capacities C(g)s and C
(gf)
s , we consider a simple case that the
state alphabet S is composed of only two elements. At each time instant, the state of the channel is G (good state)
or B (bad state). For the state G, the noise variance of the channel is σ2G. Analogously, for the state B, the noise
variance of the channel is σ2B . Here note that σ
2
B > σ
2
G. The state process is shown in Figure 3, where
P (G|G) = 1− b, P (B|G) = b, P (B|B) = 1− g, P (G|B) = g. (3.36)
The steady state probabilities pi(G) and pi(B) are given by
pi(G) =
g
g + b
, pi(B) =
b
g + b
. (3.37)
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Fig. 3: The state process of the two-state case
Fig. 4: The secrecy capacities C(g)s and C
(gf)
s for P0 = 100, σ2G = 1, σ2B = 100, σ2w = 2000, c = 1 and several
values of u
Define u = 1 − g − b and c = g/b. The parameter u is related to the channel memory, 4 and the parameter c
controls the steady state distributions (see 3.37). Fixing c (for example, c = 1), we can choose different u and d
to investigate the effects of channel memory and feedback delay on the secrecy capacities C(g)s and C
(gf)
s . Figure
4 and Figure 5 show the effect of the feedback delay on the secrecy capacities for P0 = 100, σ2G = 1, σ2B = 100,
σ2w = 2000 (σ
2
w = 1000) , c = 1 and several values of u. As we can see in Figure 4 and Figure 5, when the channel
is changing rapidly (which implies that the channel memory u is small, for example, u = 0.02), the secrecy capacity
4Mushkin and Bar-David [41] has already shown that the channel memory is increasing while u is increasing.
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Fig. 5: The secrecy capacities C(g)s and C
(gf)
s for P0 = 100, σ2G = 1, σ2B = 100, σ2w = 1000, c = 1 and several
values of u
goes to the infinite asymptote even if d = 1. However, when the channel is changing slowly (which implies that the
channel memory u is large, for example, u = 0.9), a larger feedback delay is tolerable since the secrecy capacity
loss compared with feedback without delay (d = 0) is smaller. Moreover, it is easy to see that the delayed receiver’s
channel output feedback enhances the secrecy capacity C(g)s of the degraded Gaussian case of the FSM-WC with
only delayed state feedback. Furthermore, comparing these two figures, we can see that for fixed P0, σ2G, σ2B and
c, the gap between C(g)s and C
(gf)
s is increasing while σ2w is decreasing.
B. Secrecy Capacity for the Degraded Gaussian Fading Case of Figure 2
In this subsection, we compute the secrecy capacities for the degraded Gaussian fading case of Figure 2. At the
i-th time (1 ≤ i ≤ N ), the inputs and the outputs of the channel satisfy
Yi = g(si)Xi +NSi , Zi = l(si)Yi +Nw,i. (3.38)
Here g(si) and l(si) are the fading processes of the channels for the receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively,
and they are deterministic functions of si. The noise NSi is Gaussian distributed with zero mean, and the variance
depends on the i-th time state Si of the channel. The random variable Nw,i (1 ≤ i ≤ N ) is also Gaussian distributed
with zero mean and constant variance σ2w (Nw,i ∼ N (0, σ2w) for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}). Now we apply (2.18) to
determine the secrecy capacities of this degraded Gaussian fading model with or without delayed receiver’s channel
output feedback, see the remainder of this subsection.
Secrecy capacity for the degraded Gaussian fading case of the model of Figure 2 with only delayed state
feedback:
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Fig. 6: The secrecy capacities C(g∗)s and C
(gf∗)
s for P0 = 100, σ2G = 1, σ2B = 100, σ2w = 200, c = 1, g(G) = 1,
g(B) = 0.5, l(G) = 0.8, l(B) = 0.2 and several values of u
Theorem 7: For the degraded Gaussian fading case of the model of Figure 2 with only delayed state feedback,
the secrecy capacity C(g∗)s is given by
C(g∗)s = maxP(s˜):∑s˜ pi(s˜)P(s˜)≤P0
1
2
∑
s˜
∑
s
pi(s˜)Kd(s˜, s)(
1
2
log(1 +
g2(s)P(s˜)
σ2s
)− 1
2
log(1 +
g2(s)l2(s)P(s˜)
l2(s)σ2s + σ
2
w
)). (3.39)
Proof:
Similar to Subsection III-A, let P(s˜) be the power for the state s˜, and σ2s be the variance of the noise NS given
S = s, and thus we have
I(X;Y |S = s, S˜ = s˜)− I(X;Z|S = s, S˜ = s˜)
= h(Y |S = s, S˜ = s˜)− h(Y |X,S = s, S˜ = s˜)− h(Z|S = s, S˜ = s˜) + h(Z|X,S = s, S˜ = s˜)
= h(g(s)Xs˜ +Ns)− h(Ns)− h(l(s)(g(s)Xs˜ +Ns) +Nw) + h(l(s)Ns +Nw)
(a)
≤ h(g(s)Xs˜ +Ns)− h(Ns)− 1
2
log(22h(g(s)Xs˜+Ns)l2(s) + 22h(Nw)) + h(l(s)Ns +Nw)
(b)
≤ 1
2
log(1 +
g2(s)P(s˜)
σ2s
)− 1
2
log(1 +
g2(s)l2(s)P(s˜)
l2(s)σ2s + σ
2
w
), (3.40)
where (a) is from the entropy power inequality and the property that h(aX) = h(X) + log a, and (b) is from
h(g(s)Xs˜ + Ns) − 12 log(22h(g(s)Xs˜+Ns)l2(s) + 22h(Nw)) is increasing while h(g(s)Xs˜ + Ns) is increasing, and
the fact that for a given variance, the largest entropy is achieved if the random variable is Gaussian distributed.
Furthermore, the “=” in (a) is achieved if Xs˜ ∼ N (0,P(s˜)) and Xs˜ is independent of Ns. Applying (3.40) to
(3.29), the converse proof of Theorem 7 is completed.
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Fig. 7: The secrecy capacities C(g∗)s and C
(gf∗)
s for P0 = 100, σ2G = 1, σ2B = 100, σ2w = 100, c = 1, g(G) = 1,
g(B) = 0.5, l(G) = 0.8, l(B) = 0.2 and several values of u
Here note that replacing Xi by g(si)Xi, and Yi by l(si)Yi, the achievability proof of Theorem 7 is along the
lines of that of Theorem 5, and thus we omit the proof here.
The proof of Theorem 7 is completed.
Secrecy capacity for the degraded Gaussian fading case of the model of Figure 2 with delayed state and
receiver’s channel output feedback:
Theorem 8: For the degraded Gaussian fading case of the model of Figure 2 with delayed state and receiver’s
channel output feedback, the secrecy capacity C(gf∗)s is given by
C(gf∗)s = maxP(s˜):∑s˜ pi(s˜)P(s˜)≤P0
∑
s˜
∑
s
pi(s˜)Kd(s˜, s) min{1
2
log(1+
g2(s)P(s˜)
σ2s
),
1
2
log
2pieσ2w(g
2(s)P(s˜) + σ2s)
g2(s)l2(s)P(s˜) + l2(s)σ2s + σ2w
}.
(3.41)
Proof: Replacing Xi by g(si)Xi, and Yi by l(si)Yi, the proof of Theorem 8 is along the lines of that of
Theorem 6, and thus we omit the proof here.
Numerical results of C(g∗)s and C(gf∗)s
We consider a simple two-state case where the state process is the same as that in Subsection III-A, see Figure
3. Define g(G) = 1, g(B) = 0.5, l(G) = 0.8, l(B) = 0.2, u = 1 − g − b and c = g/b. By choosing c = 1,
Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the effect of the feedback delay (d) and channel memory (u) on the secrecy capacities
C
(g∗)
s and C
(gf∗)
s for P0 = 100, σ2G = 1, σ2B = 100, σ2w = 200 (σ2w = 100) and several values of u. Similar to
the numerical result of Subsection III-A, we find that when the channel is changing rapidly (which implies that
the channel memory u is small, for example, u = 0.02), the secrecy capacity goes to the infinite asymptote even
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Fig. 8: The comparison of the secrecy capacities C(g∗)s and C
(g)
s for P0 = 100, σ2G = 1, σ2B = 100, σ2w = 200,
c = 1, g(G) = 1, g(B) = 0.5, l(G) = 0.8, l(B) = 0.2 and several values of u
if d = 1. However, when the channel is changing slowly (which implies that the channel memory u is large, for
example, u = 0.9), a larger feedback delay is tolerable since the secrecy capacity loss compared with feedback
without delay (d = 0) is smaller. Moreover, it is easy to see that the delayed receiver’s channel output feedback
enhances the secrecy capacity C(g∗)s of the degraded Gaussian fading case of the FSM-WC with only delayed state
feedback. Furthermore, comparing these two figures, we can see that for fixed P0, σ2G, σ2B and c, the gap between
C
(g∗)
s and C
(gf∗)
s is increasing while σ2w is decreasing.
Comparison of the fading and non-fading cases
The comparison of the fading and no-fading cases is shown in the following Figure 8 to Figure 11. In Figure
8 and Figure 9, we see that C(g∗)s dominates C
(g)
s (which implies that the fading may enhance the security of the
degraded Gaussian model of Figure 2 with only delayed state feedback), and the gap between C(g∗)s and C
(g)
s is
increasing while σ2w is decreasing.
In Figure 10 and Figure 11, we see that C(gf)s dominates C
(gf∗)
s (which implies that the fading may weaken the
security of the degraded Gaussian model of Figure 2 with delayed state and receiver’s channel output feedback),
and the gap between C(gf)s and C
(gf∗)
s is increasing while σ2w is increasing.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we provide inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation regions of the FSM-WC with
delayed state feedback, and with or without delayed receiver’s channel output feedback. We find that these bounds
meet if the channel output for the eavesdropper is a degraded version of that for the legitimate receiver. In the
proof of these bounds, we show that the delayed receiver’s channel output feedback is used to generate a secret key
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Fig. 9: The comparison of the secrecy capacities C(g∗)s and C
(g)
s for P0 = 100, σ2G = 1, σ2B = 100, σ2w = 100,
c = 1, g(G) = 1, g(B) = 0.5, l(G) = 0.8, l(B) = 0.2 and several values of u
shared between the receiver and the transmitter, and this key helps to enhance the rate-equivocation region of the
FSM-WC with only delayed state feedback. The results of this paper are further explained via degraded Gaussian
and degraded Gaussian fading examples. In these examples, we show that when the channel is changing rapidly,
the secrecy capacities go to the infinite asymptote even if the delayed time d is very small, and when the channel
is changing slowly, a larger feedback delay is tolerable since the secrecy capacity loss compared with feedback
without delay (d = 0) is smaller. Moreover, comparing these two examples, we find that the fading may enhance
the security of the degraded Gaussian FSM-WC with only delayed state feedback, and the fading may weaken the
security of the degraded Gaussian FSM-WC with delayed state and receiver’s channel output feedback.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The main idea of the proof of Theorem 1 is to construct a hybrid encoding-decoding scheme, which combines
the rate splitting technique, Wyner’s random binning technique [14] with the classical multiplexing coding for the
finite state Markov channel [7]. The details of the proof are as follows.
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Fig. 10: The comparison of the secrecy capacities C(gf∗)s and C
(gf)
s for P0 = 100, σ2G = 1, σ2B = 100, σ2w = 200,
c = 1, g(G) = 1, g(B) = 0.5, l(G) = 0.8, l(B) = 0.2 and several values of u
A. Definitions
• The transmitted message W is split into a common message Wc and a private message Wp, i.e., W = (Wc,Wp).
Here Wc and Wp are uniformly distributed in the sets {1, 2, ..., 2NRc} and {1, 2, ..., 2NRp}, respectively. Since
W is uniformly distributed in the set {1, 2, ..., 2NR}, we have R = Rc +Rp. In the remainder of this section,
we first prove that the region R1
R1 = {(R,Re) : 0 ≤ R = Rc +Rp,
0 ≤ Rc ≤ min{I(U ;Y |S, S˜), I(U ;Z|S, S˜)},
0 ≤ Rp ≤ I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜),
0 ≤ Re ≤ Rp,
Re ≤ I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜)}
is achievable. Then, using Fourier-Motzkin elimination (see e.g., [43]) to eliminate Rc and Rp from R1, it is
easy to see that the region R is achievable.
• Without loss of generality, we assume that the state takes values in S = {1, 2, ..., k} and that the steady state
probability pi(l) > 0 for all l ∈ S. Let Ns˜ (1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k) be the number satisfying
Ns˜ = N(pi(s˜)− ′), (A1)
where 0 ≤ ′ < min{pi(s˜); s˜ ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}} and ′ → 0 as N → ∞. Denote the transmission rates Rc and
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Fig. 11: The comparison of the secrecy capacities C(gf∗)s and C
(gf)
s for P0 = 100, σ2G = 1, σ2B = 100, σ2w = 1,
c = 1, g(G) = 1, g(B) = 0.5, l(G) = 0.8, l(B) = 0.2 and several values of u
Rp for a given s˜ by Rc(s˜) and Rp(s˜) (1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k), respectively, and they satisfy
k∑
s˜=1
pi(s˜)Rc(s˜) = Rc, (A2)
and
k∑
s˜=1
pi(s˜)Rp(s˜) = Rp. (A3)
• Divide the common message Wc into k sub-messages Wc,1,...,Wc,k, and each sub-message Wc,s˜ (1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k)
takes values in the set Wc,s˜ = {1, 2, ..., 2Ns˜Rc(s˜)}. Since the actual transmission rate R∗c of the common
message Wc is denoted by
R∗c =
H(Wc)
N
=
∑k
s˜=1H(Wc,s˜)
N
=
∑k
s˜=1Ns˜Rc(s˜)
N
(a)
=
∑k
s˜=1N(pi(s˜)− 
′
)Rc(s˜)
N
=
k∑
s˜=1
(pi(s˜)− ′)Rc(s˜)
=
k∑
s˜=1
pi(s˜)Rc(s˜)− ′
k∑
s˜=1
Rc(s˜), (A4)
where (a) is from (A1). From (A2) and (A4), it is easy to see that R∗c tends to be Rc while 
′ → 0.
• Divide the private message Wp into k sub-messages Wp,1,...,Wp,k, and each sub-message Wp,s˜ (1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k)
takes values in the set Wp,s˜ = {1, 2, ..., 2Ns˜Rp(s˜)}. Similar to (A4), the actual transmission rate R∗p of the
private message Wp tends to be Rp while 
′ → 0.
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B. Construction of the code-books
Fix the joint probability mass function PUV SS˜XY Z(u, v, s, s˜, x, y, z) satisfying (2.11).
• Construction of UN : Construct k code-books U s˜ of UN for all s˜ ∈ S. In each code-book U s˜, randomly
generate 2Ns˜Rc(s˜) i.i.d. sequences uNs˜ according to the probability mass function PU |S˜(u|s˜), and index these
sequences as uNs˜(i), where 1 ≤ i ≤ 2Ns˜Rc(s˜).
• Construction of V N : Construct k code-books V s˜ of V N for all s˜ ∈ S. In each code-book V s˜, randomly gen-
erate 2Ns˜(I(V ;Y |U,S,S˜=s˜)+Rc(s˜)) i.i.d. sequences vNs˜ according to the probability mass function PV |U,S˜(v|u, s˜).
Index these sequences of the code-book V s˜ as vNs˜(is˜, as˜, bs˜), where 1 ≤ is˜ ≤ 2Ns˜Rc(s˜), as˜ ∈ As˜ =
{1, 2, ..., As˜}, bs˜ ∈ Bs˜ = {1, 2, ..., Bs˜},
As˜ = 2
Ns˜(I(V ;Y |U,S,S˜=s˜)−I(V ;Z|U,S,S˜=s˜)), (A5)
and
Bs˜ = 2
Ns˜I(V ;Z|U,S,S˜=s˜). (A6)
• Construction of XN : For each s˜, the sequence xNs˜ is i.i.d. generated according to a new discrete memoryless
channel (DMC) with transition probability PX|U,V,S˜(x|u, v, s˜). The inputs of this new DMC are uNs˜ and vNs˜ ,
while the output is xNs˜ .
C. Encoding scheme
For a fixed length N , let Ls˜ be the number of times during the N symbols for which the delayed feedback
state at the transmitter is S˜ = s˜. Every time that the corresponding delayed state is S˜ = s˜, the transmitter
chooses the next symbols of uN and vN from the component code-books U s˜ and V s˜, respectively. Since Ls˜ is
not necessarily equivalent to Ns˜, an error is declared if Ls˜ < Ns˜, and the codes are filled with zero if Ls˜ > Ns˜.
Therefore, we can send a total of 2
∑k
i=1Ni(Rc(i)+Rp(i)) messages. Since the state process is stationary and ergodic
limN→∞ Ls˜N = Pr{S˜ = s˜} in probability. Thus, we have
Pr{Ls˜ < Ns˜} → 0, as N →∞. (A7)
For each s˜ ∈ S, defineWp,s˜ = As˜×Js˜, where Js˜ = {1, 2, ..., Js˜} and Js˜ = 2Ns˜(Rp(s˜)−I(V ;Y |U,S,S˜=s˜)+I(V ;Z|U,S,S˜=s˜)).
Furthermore, we define the mapping gs˜ : Bs˜ → Js˜, and partition Bs˜ into Js˜ subsets with nearly equal size. Here
the “nearly equal size” means
‖g−1s˜ (j1)‖ ≤ 2‖g−1s˜ (j2)‖, ∀j1, j2 ∈ Js˜. (A8)
The transmitted codewords uN and vN are obtained by multiplexing the different component codewords. Specifically,
first, suppose that a message w = (wc, wp) = (wc,1, ..., wc,k, wp,1, ..., wp,k) is transmitted, and here we denote wp,s˜
(1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k) by (as˜, js˜), where as˜ ∈ As˜ and js˜ ∈ Js˜. Second, in each component code-book U s˜ (1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k), the
transmitter chooses uNs˜(wc,s˜) as the s˜-th component codeword of the transmitted uN . Third, in each component
code-book V s˜ (1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k), the transmitter chooses vNs˜(i∗s˜, a∗s˜, b∗s˜) as the s˜-th component codeword of the transmitted
vN , where i∗s˜ = wc,s˜, a
∗
s˜ = as˜, and b
∗
s˜ is randomly chosen from the sub-set js˜ of Bs˜.
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D. Decoding scheme
• (Decoding scheme for the receiver:)
– (Decoding the common message wc:) The delayed feedback state S˜ at the transmitter, which is used
to multiplex the component codewords, is also available at the receiver. Thus once the receiver receives
yN and the state sequence sN , he first demultiplexes them into outputs corresponding to the component
code-books and separately decodes each component codeword. To be specific, in each code-book U s˜, the
receiver has (yNs˜ , sNs˜) and tries to search a unique uNs˜ such that (uNs˜ , yNs˜ , sNs˜) are strongly jointly
typical sequences [4], i.e.,
(uNs˜ , yNs˜ , sNs˜) ∈ TNs˜
U,S,Y |S˜(). (A9)
If there exists such a unique uNs˜ , put out the corresponding index wˆc,s˜. Otherwise, i.e., if no such
sequence exists or multiple sequences have different message indices, declare a decoding error. If for
all 1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k, there exist unique sequences uNs˜ such that (A9) is satisfied, the receiver declares that
wˆc = (wˆc,1, wˆc,2, ..., wˆc,k) is sent. Based on the AEP, the error probability Pr{wˆc,s˜ 6= wc,s˜} (1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k)
goes to 0 if
Rc(s˜) ≤ I(U ;Y |S, S˜ = s˜). (A10)
– (Decoding the private message wp:) After decoding uNs˜(wˆc,s˜) and wˆc,s˜ for all 1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k, in each
component code-book V s˜, the receiver tries to find a unique sequence vNs˜ such that
(vNs˜ , uNs˜ , yNs˜ , sNs˜) ∈ TNs˜
U,V,S,Y |S˜(). (A11)
If there exists such a unique vNs˜ , put out the corresponding indexes iˆs˜, aˆs˜ and bˆs˜. Otherwise, i.e., if
no such sequence exists or multiple sequences have different message indices, declare a decoding error.
After the receiver obtains the index bˆs˜, he also knows jˆs˜ since it is the index of the sub-set which bˆs˜
belongs to. Thus, for 1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k, the receiver has an estimation wˆp,s˜ of the private message wp,s˜ by
letting wˆp,s˜ = (aˆs˜, jˆs˜). If for all 1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k, there exist unique sequences vNs˜ such that (A11) is satisfied,
the receiver declares that wˆp = (wˆp,1, wˆp,2, ..., wˆp,k) is sent. Based on the AEP, the error probability
Pr{wˆp,s˜ 6= wp,s˜} (1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k) goes to 0 if
Rp(s˜) ≤ I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ = s˜). (A12)
• (Decoding scheme for the eavesdropper:)
– (Decoding the common message wc:) The delayed feedback state S˜ at the transmitter, is also available at
the eavesdropper. Thus once the eavesdropper receives zN and the state sequence sN , he first demultiplexes
them into outputs corresponding to the component code-books and separately decodes each component
codeword. To be specific, in each code-book U s˜, the eavesdropper has (zNs˜ , sNs˜) and tries to search a
unique uNs˜ such that (uNs˜ , zNs˜ , sNs˜) are strongly jointly typical sequences [4], i.e.,
(uNs˜ , zNs˜ , sNs˜) ∈ TNs˜
U,S,Z|S˜(). (A13)
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If there exists such a unique uNs˜ , put out the corresponding index wˇc,s˜. Otherwise, i.e., if no such
sequence exists or multiple sequences have different message indices, declare a decoding error. If for all
1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k, there exist unique sequences uNs˜ such that (A13) is satisfied, the eavesdropper declares that
wˇc = (wˇc,1, wˇc,2, ..., wˇc,k) is sent. Based on the AEP, the error probability Pr{wˇc,s˜ 6= wc,s˜} (1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k)
goes to 0 if
Rc(s˜) ≤ I(U ;Z|S, S˜ = s˜). (A14)
– (Given wc and wp, decoding vN :) In each component code-book V s˜ (1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k), given S˜ = s˜, sNs˜ ,
uNs˜(wc,s˜) and wp,s˜ = (as˜, js˜), the eavesdropper tries to find a unique bˇs˜ such that
(vNs˜(wc,s˜, as˜, bˇs˜), u
Ns˜(wc,s˜), z
Ns˜ , sNs˜) ∈ TNs˜
U,V,S,Z|S˜(). (A15)
Since the index b∗s˜ of the transmitted v
Ns˜ is randomly chosen from the sub-set js˜ of Bs˜ and there are
2Ns˜(I(V ;Y |U,S,S˜=s˜)−Rp(s˜)) sequences of vNs˜ in the sub-set js˜, based on the AEP, the error probability
Pr{bˇs˜ 6= b∗s˜} (1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k) goes to 0 if
I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ = s˜)−Rp(s˜) ≤ I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜ = s˜). (A16)
Combining (A2) with (A10) and (A14), we have
Rc =
k∑
s˜=1
pi(s˜)Rc(s˜)
≤
k∑
s˜=1
pi(s˜) min{I(U ;Y |S, S˜ = s˜), I(U ;Z|S, S˜ = s˜)}
= min{I(U ;Y |S, S˜), I(U ;Z|S, S˜)}, (A17)
and combining (A3) with (A12), we have
Rp =
k∑
s˜=1
pi(s˜)Rp(s˜)
≤
k∑
s˜=1
pi(s˜)I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ = s˜)
= I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜). (A18)
It remains to show that Re ≤ I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜) and Re ≤ Rp, see the followings.
E. Equivocation analysis:
Since the eavesdropper also knows the state SN and the delayed time d, the equivocation ∆ is bounded by
∆ =
1
N
H(W |ZN , SN ) = 1
N
H(Wc,Wp|ZN , SN )
≥ 1
N
H(Wp|ZN , SN ,Wc) ≥ 1
N
H(Wp|ZN , SN ,Wc, UN )
(a)
=
1
N
H(Wp|ZN , SN , UN ) = 1
N
H(Wp,1,Wp,2, ...,Wp,k|ZN , SN , UN )
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=
1
N
k∑
s˜=1
H(Wp,s˜|ZN , SN , UN ,Wp,1, ...,Wp,s˜−1)
≥ 1
N
k∑
s˜=1
H(Wp,s˜|ZN , SN , UN ,Wp,1, ...,Wp,s˜−1, S˜ = s˜)
(b)
=
1
N
k∑
s˜=1
H(Wp,s˜|ZNs˜ , SNs˜ , UNs˜ , S˜ = s˜)
=
1
N
k∑
s˜=1
(H(Wp,s˜, Z
Ns˜ , SNs˜ , UNs˜ , S˜ = s˜)−H(ZNs˜ , SNs˜ , UNs˜ , S˜ = s˜))
=
1
N
k∑
s˜=1
(H(Wp,s˜, Z
Ns˜ , SNs˜ , UNs˜ , V Ns˜ , S˜ = s˜)−H(V Ns˜ |Wp,s˜, ZNs˜ , SNs˜ , UNs˜ , S˜ = s˜)
−H(ZNs˜ , SNs˜ , UNs˜ , S˜ = s˜))
(c)
=
1
N
k∑
s˜=1
(H(ZNs˜ |SNs˜ , UNs˜ , V Ns˜ , S˜ = s˜) +H(SNs˜ , UNs˜ , V Ns˜ , S˜ = s˜)
−H(ZNs˜ |SNs˜ , UNs˜ , S˜ = s˜)−H(SNs˜ , UNs˜ , S˜ = s˜)−H(V Ns˜ |Wp,s˜, ZNs˜ , SNs˜ , UNs˜ , S˜ = s˜))
(d)
≥ 1
N
k∑
s˜=1
(Ns˜H(Z|S,U, V, S˜ = s˜)−H(ZNs˜ |SNs˜ , UNs˜ , S˜ = s˜) +H(SNs˜ , UNs˜ , V Ns˜ , S˜ = s˜)−H(SNs˜ , UNs˜ , S˜ = s˜)
−H(V Ns˜ |Wp,s˜, ZNs˜ , SNs˜ , UNs˜ , S˜ = s˜))
≥ 1
N
k∑
s˜=1
(Ns˜H(Z|S,U, V, S˜ = s˜)−Ns˜H(Z|S,U, S˜ = s˜) +H(SNs˜ , UNs˜ , V Ns˜ , S˜ = s˜)−H(SNs˜ , UNs˜ , S˜ = s˜)
−H(V Ns˜ |Wp,s˜, ZNs˜ , SNs˜ , UNs˜ , S˜ = s˜))
=
1
N
k∑
s˜=1
(Ns˜H(Z|S,U, V, S˜ = s˜)−Ns˜H(Z|S,U, S˜ = s˜)
+H(V Ns˜ |SNs˜ , UNs˜ , S˜ = s˜)−H(V Ns˜ |Wp,s˜, ZNs˜ , SNs˜ , UNs˜ , S˜ = s˜))
(e)
≥ 1
N
k∑
s˜=1
(Ns˜H(Z|S,U, V, S˜)−Ns˜H(Z|S,U, S˜ = s˜)
+Ns˜I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ = s˜)− 1−H(V Ns˜ |Wp,s˜, ZNs˜ , SNs˜ , UNs˜ , S˜ = s˜))
(f)
≥ 1
N
k∑
s˜=1
(Ns˜H(Z|S,U, V, S˜ = s˜)−Ns˜H(Z|S,U, S˜ = s˜) +Ns˜I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜)− 1−Ns˜1)
=
k∑
s˜=1
Ns˜
N
(I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ = s˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜ = s˜)− 1
Ns˜
− 1)
(g)
=
k∑
s˜=1
(pi(s˜)− ′)(I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ = s˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜ = s˜)− 1
Ns˜
− 1)
= I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜)−
k∑
s˜=1
(pi(s˜)− ′)( 1
Ns˜
+ 1)
−′
k∑
s˜=1
(I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜)), (A19)
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where (a) is from the fact that H(Wc|UN ) = 0, (b) is from the the Markov chain (ZN1˜ , ..., ZNs˜−1 , ZNs˜+1 , ..., ZNk ,
UN1˜ , ..., UNs˜−1 , UNs˜+1 , ..., UNk , SN1˜ , ..., SNs˜−1 , SNs˜+1 , ..., SNk) → (ZNs˜ , SNs˜ , UNs˜ , S˜ = s˜) → Wp,s˜, which
implies that given the s˜-th component of the sequences ZN , UN and SN , Wp,s˜ is independent of the other parts of
ZN , UN and SN , (c) is from the fact that H(Wp,s˜|V Ns˜) = 0, (d) is from the fact that the channel is a DMC with
transition probability PY,Z|X,S(y, z|x, s), and for each s˜, XNs˜ is i.i.d. generated according to a new DMC with
transition probability PX|U,V,S˜(x|u, v, s˜), thus we have H(ZNs˜ |SNs˜ , UNs˜ , V Ns˜ , S˜ = s˜) = Ns˜H(Z|S,U, V, S˜ = s˜),
(e) is from the fact that for given s˜, uNs˜ and sNs˜ , V Ns˜ has As˜ · Bs˜ possible values, and the encoding mapping
function gs˜ partitions Bs˜ into js˜ subsets with “nearly equal size” (see (A8)), using a similar lemma in [16], we
have
1
Ns˜
H(V Ns˜ |SNs˜ , UNs˜ , S˜ = s˜) ≥ 1
Ns˜
logAs˜ +
1
Ns˜
logBs˜ − 1
Ns˜
, (A20)
(f) is from the fact that given S˜ = s˜, sNs˜ , uNs˜(wc,s˜) and wp,s˜ = (as˜, js˜), the eavesdropper’s decoding error
probability of vNs˜ tends to zero if (A16) is satisfied, and thus, by using Fano’s inequality, we have
1
Ns˜
H(V Ns˜ |Wp,s˜, ZNs˜ , SNs˜ , UNs˜ , S˜ = s˜) ≤ 1, (A21)
where 1 → 0 as Ns˜ →∞, and (g) is from (A1).
From (A19), we have
∆ ≥ I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜)− 2, (A22)
where 2 is small for sufficiently large N . By the definition of Re, we can conclude that Re ≤ I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜)−
I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜).
In addition, we know that (A21) holds if (A16) is satisfied, and this implies that
Rp =
k∑
s˜=1
pi(s˜)Rp(s˜)
≥
k∑
s˜=1
pi(s˜)(I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ = s˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜ = s˜))
= I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜) ≥ Re. (A23)
Thus, Re ≤ I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜) and Re ≤ Rp are proved, and the achievability proof of the region
R1 is completed. Finally, using Fourier-Motzkin elimination (see e.g., [43]) to eliminate Rc and Rp from R1, the
proof of Theorem 1 is completed.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
In this section, we will prove Theorem 2: all the achievable (R,Re) pairs are contained in the setRout. Since Re ≤
R is obvious, we only need to prove the inequalities R ≤ I(V ;Y |S, S˜) and Re ≤ I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜)−I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜)
of Theorem 2 in the remainder of this section.
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First, define the following auxiliary random variables,
U , (Y J−1, ZNJ+1, SN , J), V , (U,W ), S , SJ , S˜ , SJ−d, Y , YJ , Z , ZJ , (A24)
where J is a random variable uniformly distributed over {1, 2, , ..., N}, and it is independent of Y N , ZN , W and
SN .
Proof of R ≤ I(V ;Y |S, S˜): Note that
R− 
(a)
≤ 1
N
H(W )
(b)
=
1
N
H(W |SN )
=
1
N
(I(W ;Y N |SN ) +H(W |Y N , SN ))
(c)
≤ 1
N
(I(W ;Y N |SN ) + δ(Pe))
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Y i−1, SN )−H(Yi|Y i−1, SN ,W )) + δ(Pe)
N
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Si, Si−d)−H(Yi|Y i−1, ZNi+1, SN ,W )) +
δ(Pe)
N
(d)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Si, Si−d)−H(Yi|Y i−1, ZNi+1, SN ,W, Si, Si−d)) +
δ(Pe)
N
(e)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Si, Si−d, J = i)−H(Yi|Y i−1, ZNi+1, SN ,W, Si, Si−d, J = i)) +
δ(Pe)
N
(f)
= H(YJ |SJ , SJ−d, J)−H(YJ |SJ , SJ−d,W, Y J−1, ZNJ+1, SN , J) +
δ(Pe)
N
≤ H(YJ |SJ , SJ−d)−H(YJ |SJ , SJ−d,W, Y J−1, ZNJ+1, SN , J) +
δ(Pe)
N
(g)
= H(Y |S, S˜)−H(Y |S, S˜, V ) + δ(Pe)
N
(h)
≤ I(V ;Y |S, S˜) + δ()
N
, (A25)
where (a) is from (2.10), (b) is from the fact that W is independent of SN , (c) is from the Fano’s inequality, (d)
is from the fact that Si and Si−d (here Si−d = const when i ≤ d) are included in SN , and thus there exists a
Markov chain (Si, Si−d)→ (Y i−1, ZNi+1, SN ,W )→ Yi, (e) is from the fact that J is a random variable (uniformly
distributed over {1, 2, ..., N}), and it is independent of Y N , ZN , W and SN , (f) is from J is uniformly distributed
over {1, 2, ..., N}, (g) is from the definitions in (A24), and (h) is from δ(Pe) is increasing while Pe is increasing,
and Pe ≤ . Then, letting → 0, we have R ≤ I(V ;Y |S, S˜).
Proof of Re ≤ I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜): By using (2.9) and (2.10), we have
Re − 
(1)
≤ 1
N
H(W |ZN , SN )
=
1
N
(H(W |SN )− I(W ;ZN |SN ))
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=
1
N
(H(W |SN )−H(W |SN , Y N ) +H(W |SN , Y N )− I(W ;ZN |SN ))
(2)
≤ 1
N
(I(W ;Y N |SN )− I(W ;ZN |SN ) + δ(Pe))
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(W ;Yi|Y i−1, SN )− I(W ;Zi|ZNi+1, SN )) +
δ(Pe)
N
, (A26)
where (1) from (2.10), and (2) is from the Fano’s inequality.
The character I(W ;Yi|Y i−1, SN ) in (A26) can be processed as
I(W ;Yi|Y i−1, SN ) = H(Yi|Y i−1, SN )−H(Yi|Y i−1, SN ,W )
= H(Yi|Y i−1, SN )−H(Yi|Y i−1, SN ,W )−H(Yi|Y i−1, ZNi+1, SN ) +H(Yi|Y i−1, ZNi+1, SN )
+H(Yi|Y i−1, ZNi+1, SN ,W )−H(Yi|Y i−1, ZNi+1, SN ,W )
= I(Yi;Z
N
i+1|Y i−1, SN )− I(Yi;ZNi+1|Y i−1, SN ,W ) + I(W ;Yi|Y i−1, ZNi+1, SN ), (A27)
and the character I(W ;Zi|ZNi+1, SN ) in (A26) can be processed as
I(W ;Zi|ZNi+1, SN ) = H(Zi|ZNi+1, SN )−H(Zi|ZNi+1, SN ,W )
= H(Zi|ZNi+1, SN )−H(Zi|ZNi+1, SN ,W )−H(Zi|Y i−1, ZNi+1, SN ) +H(Zi|Y i−1, ZNi+1, SN )
+H(Zi|Y i−1, ZNi+1, SN ,W )−H(Zi|Y i−1, ZNi+1, SN ,W )
= I(Zi;Y
i−1|ZNi+1, SN )− I(Zi;Y i−1|ZNi+1, SN ,W ) + I(W ;Zi|Y i−1, ZNi+1, SN ). (A28)
Substituting (A27) and (A28) into (A26), and using the properties
N∑
i=1
I(Yi;Z
N
i+1|Y i−1, SN ) =
N∑
i=1
I(Zi;Y
i−1|ZNi+1, SN ) (A29)
and
N∑
i=1
I(Yi;Z
N
i+1|Y i−1, SN ,W ) =
N∑
i=1
I(Zi;Y
i−1|ZNi+1, SN ,W ), (A30)
we have
Re − 
(a)
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(W ;Yi|Y i−1, ZNi+1, SN )− I(W ;Zi|Y i−1, ZNi+1, SN )) +
δ(Pe)
N
(b)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(W ;Yi|Y i−1, ZNi+1, SN , Si−d, Si)− I(W ;Zi|Y i−1, ZNi+1, SN , Si−d, Si)) +
δ(Pe)
N
(c)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(W ;Yi|Y i−1, ZNi+1, SN , Si−d, Si, J = i)− I(W ;Zi|Y i−1, ZNi+1, SN , Si−d, Si, J = i)) +
δ(Pe)
N
(d)
= I(W ;YJ |Y J−1, ZNJ+1, SN , SJ−d, SJ , J)− I(W ;ZJ |Y J−1, ZNJ+1, SN , SJ−d, SJ , J) +
δ(Pe)
N
(e)
= I(V ;Y |U, S˜, S)− I(V ;Z|U, S˜, S) + δ(Pe)
N
(f)
≤ I(V ;Y |U, S˜, S)− I(V ;Z|U, S˜, S) + δ()
N
, (A31)
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where (a) is from (A29) and (A30) (b) is from the fact that Si and Si−d (here Si−d = const when i ≤ d) are
included in SN , (c) is from the fact that J is a random variable (uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., N}), and it
is independent of Y N , ZN , W and SN , (d) is from J is uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., N}, (e) is from the
definitions in (A24), and (f) is from δ(Pe) is increasing while Pe is increasing, and Pe ≤ . Letting  → 0, we
have Re ≤ I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜) − I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜). Now it remains to prove the equalities (A29) and (A30), see the
followings.
Proof:
Using the chain rule, the left parts of (A29) and (A30) can be re-written as
N∑
i=1
I(Yi;Z
N
i+1|Y i−1, SN ) =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
I(Yi;Zj |Y i−1, SN , ZNj+1), (A32)
and
N∑
i=1
I(Yi;Z
N
i+1|Y i−1, SN ,W ) =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
I(Yi;Zj |Y i−1, SN , ZNj+1,W ). (A33)
The right parts of (A29) and (A30) can be re-written as
N∑
i=1
I(Zi;Y
i−1|ZNi+1, SN ) =
N∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
I(Yj ;Zi|Y j−1, SN , ZNi+1)
=
N∑
j=1
j−1∑
i=1
I(Yi;Zj |Y i−1, SN , ZNj+1)
=
N∑
j=i+1
N∑
i=1
I(Yi;Zj |Y i−1, SN , ZNj+1), (A34)
and
N∑
i=1
I(Zi;Y
i−1|ZNi+1, SN ,W ) =
N∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
I(Yj ;Zi|Y j−1, SN , ZNi+1,W )
=
N∑
j=1
j−1∑
i=1
I(Yi;Zj |Y i−1, SN , ZNj+1,W )
=
N∑
j=i+1
N∑
i=1
I(Yi;Zj |Y i−1, SN , ZNj+1,W ). (A35)
By checking (A32)-(A35), it is easy to see that (A29) and (A30) hold, and the proof is completed.
The proof of Theorem 2 is completed.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF (2.15)
Replacing V N by XN , and letting Wc, UN be constants, the achievability of (2.15) is along the lines of the
direct proof of Theorem 1 (see Appendix A), and thus we only need to show the converse proof of (2.15). Since
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Re ≤ R is obvious, it remains to show that R ≤ I(X;Y |S, S˜) and Re ≤ I(X;Y |S, S˜) − I(X;Z|S, S˜), see the
followings.
Note that
R−  ≤ 1
N
H(W ) ≤ 1
N
(I(W ;Y N |SN ) + δ(Pe))
(a)
≤ 1
N
(I(XN ;Y N |SN ) + δ(Pe))
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Y i−1, SN )−H(Yi|Y i−1, SN , XN )) + δ(Pe)
N
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Si, Si−d)−H(Yi|Y i−1, SN , XN )) + δ(Pe)
N
(b)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Si, Si−d)−H(Yi|Si, Xi)) + δ(Pe)
N
(c)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Si, Si−d)−H(Yi|Si, Xi, Si−d)) + δ(Pe)
N
(d)
= H(YJ |SJ , SJ−d, J)−H(YJ |SJ , SJ−d, XJ , J) + δ(Pe)
N
(e)
≤ H(YJ |SJ , SJ−d)−H(YJ |SJ , SJ−d, XJ) + δ(Pe)
N
(f)
≤ I(X;Y |S, S˜) + δ()
N
, (A36)
where (a) is from H(W |XN ) = 0, (b) is from the Markov chain (Y i−1, Si−1, SNi+1, Xi−1, XNi+1)→ (Si, Xi)→ Yi,
(c) is from the Markov chain Si−d → (Si, Xi) → Yi, (d) is from the fact that J is a random variable (uniformly
distributed over {1, 2, ..., N}), and it is independent of Y N , ZN , W and SN , (e) is from the Markov chains
(J, SJ−d)→ (SJ , XJ)→ YJ and SJ−d → (SJ , XJ)→ YJ , and (f) is from the definitions in (A24), X , XJ and
the fact that δ(Pe) ≤ δ(). Then, letting → 0, we have R ≤ I(X;Y |S, S˜).
Similarly, note that
Re − 
(1)
≤ H(W |Z
N , SN )
N
=
1
N
(H(W |ZN , SN )−H(W |ZN , SN , Y N ) +H(W |ZN , SN , Y N ))
(2)
≤ 1
N
(I(W ;Y N |ZN , SN ) + δ(Pe))
≤ 1
N
(H(Y N |ZN , SN )−H(Y N |ZN , SN ,W,XN ) + δ(Pe))
(3)
=
1
N
(H(Y N |ZN , SN )−H(Y N |ZN , SN , XN ) + δ(Pe))
=
1
N
(I(XN ;Y N |ZN , SN ) + δ(Pe))
(4)
=
1
N
(H(XN |ZN , SN )−H(XN |Y N , SN ) +H(XN |SN )−H(XN |SN ) + δ(Pe))
=
1
N
(I(XN ;Y N |SN )− I(XN ;ZN |SN ) + δ(Pe))
31
,
(5)
≤ 1
N
(I(XN ;Y N |SN )− I(XN ;ZN |SN ) + δ()), (A37)
where (1) is from (2.10), (2) is from Fano’s inequality, (3) is from the fact that H(W |XN ) = 0, (4) is from the
Markov chain XN → (Y N , SN )→ ZN , and (5) is from the fact that Pe ≤  and δ(Pe) is increasing while Pe is
increasing.
The character I(XN ;Y N |SN )− I(XN ;ZN |SN ) in (A81) can be further bounded by
1
N
I(XN ;Y N |SN )− I(XN ;ZN |SN )
(a)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Y i−1, SN )−H(Yi|Xi, Si)−H(Zi|Zi−1, SN ) +H(Zi|Xi, Si))
(b)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Y i−1, SN , Zi−1)−H(Yi|Xi, Si)−H(Zi|Zi−1, SN ) +H(Zi|Xi, Si))
(c)
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Si, Si−d, SN , Zi−1)−H(Yi|Xi, Si, Si−d)−H(Zi|Zi−1, Si, Si−d, SN ) +H(Zi|Xi, Si, Si−d))
(d)
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi|Si, Si−d)−H(Yi|Xi, Si, Si−d)−H(Zi|Si, Si−d) +H(Zi|Xi, Si, Si−d))
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(Xi;Yi|Si, Si−d)− I(Xi;Zi|Si, Si−d))
(e)
= I(XJ ;YJ |SJ , SJ−d, J)− I(XJ ;ZJ |SJ , SJ−d, J)
(f)
≤ I(XJ ;YJ |SJ , SJ−d)− I(XJ ;ZJ |SJ , SJ−d)
(g)
= I(X;Y |S, S˜)− I(X;Z|S, S˜), (A38)
where (a) is from the Markov chains (Y i−1, Si−1, SNi+1, X
i−1, XNi+1)→ (Si, Xi)→ Yi and (Zi−1, Si−1, SNi+1, Xi−1,
XNi+1)→ (Si, Xi)→ Zi, (b) is from the Markov chain Yi → (Y i−1, SN )→ Zi−1, (c) is from the Markov chains
Si−d → (Xi, Si)→ Yi and Si−d → (Xi, Si)→ Zi, and the fact that Si and Si−d are a part of SN (here note that
Si−d = const if i ≤ d), (d) is from
H(Yi|Si, Si−d, SN , Zi−1)−H(Zi|Zi−1, Si, Si−d, SN ) ≤ H(Yi|Si, Si−d)−H(Zi|Si, Si−d), (A39)
(e) is from the fact that J is a random variable (uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., N}), and it is independent of
Y N , ZN , W and SN , (f) is from the Markov chains (J, SJ−d) → (SJ , XJ) → YJ , SJ−d → (SJ , XJ) → YJ ,
(J, SJ−d)→ (SJ , XJ)→ ZJ , SJ−d → (SJ , XJ)→ ZJ and the fact that
H(YJ |SJ , SJ−d, J)−H(ZJ |SJ , SJ−d, J) ≤ H(YJ |SJ , SJ−d)−H(ZJ |SJ , SJ−d), (A40)
and (g) is from the definitions in (A24) and X , XJ . Here note that the proof of (A40) is analogous to that of
(A39), and thus we only need to prove the above (A39), see the followings.
Proof of (A39):
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Proof: Note that (A39) is equivalent to
I(Zi;Z
i−1, SN |Si, Si−d) ≤ I(Yi;SN , Zi−1|Si, Si−d). (A41)
Since
I(Zi;Z
i−1, SN |Si, Si−d) = H(Zi−1, SN |Si, Si−d)−H(Zi−1, SN |Si, Si−d, Zi)
≤ H(Zi−1, SN |Si, Si−d)−H(Zi−1, SN |Si, Si−d, Zi, Yi)
(1)
= H(Zi−1, SN |Si, Si−d)−H(Zi−1, SN |Si, Si−d, Yi)
= I(Yi;S
N , Zi−1|Si, Si−d), (A42)
where (1) is from the Markov chain (Zi−1, SN )→ (Si, Si−d, Yi)→ Zi. Then it is easy to see that (A41) is proved,
and thus the proof of (A39) is completed.
Substituting (A38) into (A81), and letting  → 0, Re ≤ I(X;Y |S, S˜) − I(X;Z|S, S˜) is proved. The converse
and entire proof of (2.15) is completed.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Rate splitting, block Markov coding, multiplexing random binning, and the idea of using the delayed receiver’s
channel output feedback as a secret key [42] are combined to show the achievability of Rfi in Theorem 3. The
outline of the proof is as follows. Notations and definitions are given in Subsection D-A, the construction of
the code-books are shown in Subsection D-B, the encoding and decoding schemes are respectively introduced in
Subsection D-C and Subsection D-D, and the equivocation analysis is shown in Subsection D-E.
A. Definitions
• The state takes values in S = {1, 2, ..., k} and the steady state probability pi(l) > 0 for all l ∈ S. Let Ns˜
(1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k) be the number satisfying
Ns˜ = N(pi(s˜)− ′), (A43)
where 0 ≤ ′ < min{pi(s˜); s˜ ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}} and ′ → 0 as N →∞.
• The message W = (W1, ...,Wn) is transmitted through n blocks, and similar to the definitions in Appendix A,
the uniformly distributed message W is divided into a common message Wc and a private message Wp (W =
(Wc,Wp)), and W , Wc and Wp take values in the sets {1, 2, ..., 2nNR}, {1, 2, ..., 2nNRc} and {1, 2, ..., 2nNRp},
respectively. Here R = Rc +Rp. In the remainder of this section, we first prove
Rfi = {(Rc, Rp, Re) : 0 ≤ Re ≤ Rp,
Rc ≤ min{I(U ;Y |S, S˜), I(U ;Z|S, S˜)},
Rp ≤ I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜),
Re ≤ [I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜)]+ +H(Y |V,Z, S, S˜)}, (A44)
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is achievable. Then, using Fourier-Motzkin elimination to eliminate Rc and Rp from Rfi, Rfi is directly
obtained.
• In order to prove Rfi is achievable, it is sufficient to show the following two cases are achievable.
– (Case 1:) for the case that I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜) ≥ I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜), we only need to show that (Rc =
min{I(U ;Y |S, S˜), I(U ;Z|S, S˜)}, Rp = I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜), Re = I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜) +Rf )
is achievable, where
Rf = min{H(Y |V,Z, S, S˜), I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜)}. (A45)
– (Case 2:) for the case that I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜) < I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜), we only need to show that (Rc =
min{I(U ;Y |S, S˜), I(U ;Z|S, S˜)}, Rp = I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜), Re = R∗f ) is achievable, where
R∗f = min{H(Y |V,Z, S, S˜), I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜)}. (A46)
• Define
Rp,1 = [I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜)]+, (A47)
and
Rp = Rp,1 +Rp,2. (A48)
• In block i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the message Wi is divided into k sub-messages, i.e., Wi = (Wi,1, ...,Wi,k),
where Wi,s˜ = (Wi,s˜,c,Wi,s˜,p,1,Wi,s˜,p,2) (1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k), Wi,s˜,c, Wi,s˜,p,1 and Wi,s˜,p,2 take values in the sets
{1, 2, ..., 2Ns˜Rc(s˜)}, {1, 2, ..., 2Ns˜Rp,1(s˜)} and {1, 2, ..., 2Ns˜Rp,2(s˜)}, respectively, and Ns˜ satisfies (A43). Here
Rc(s˜) = min{I(U ;Y |S, S˜ = s˜), I(U ;Z|S, S˜ = s˜)}, (A49)
Rp,1(s˜) = [I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ = s˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜ = s˜)]+, (A50)
Rp,2(s˜) = Rp(s˜)−Rp,1(s˜)
= I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ = s˜)− [I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ = s˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜ = s˜)]+
= min{I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ = s˜), I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜ = s˜)}. (A51)
Note that Rc(s˜), Rp,1(s˜) and Rp,2(s˜) are the transmission rates Rc, Rp,1 and Rp,2 for a given s˜, respectively.
Furthermore, it is easy to see that
k∑
s˜=1
pi(s˜)Rc(s˜) = Rc,
k∑
s˜=1
pi(s˜)Rp,1(s˜) = Rp,1,
k∑
s˜=1
pi(s˜)Rp,2(s˜) = Rp,2. (A52)
From the above definitions, it is easy to see that Wc = (W1,1,c, ...,W1,k,c,W2,1,c, ...,W2,k,c, ...,Wn,1,c, ...,Wn,k,c)
and Wp = (Wp,1,Wp,2), where Wp,1 = (W1,1,p,1, ...,W1,k,p,1,W2,1,p,1, ...,W2,k,p,1, ...,Wn,1,p,1, ...,Wn,k,p,1)
and Wp,2 = (W1,1,p,2, ...,W1,k,p,2,W2,1,p,2, ...,W2,k,p,2, ...,Wn,1,p,2, ...,Wn,k,p,2).
34
• The transmission rate R∗c of the common message Wc is denoted by
R∗c =
H(Wc)
nN
=
∑n
i=1
∑k
s˜=1H(Wi,s˜,c)
nN
=
∑n
i=1
∑k
s˜=1Ns˜Rc(s˜)
nN
(a)
=
∑n
i=1
∑k
s˜=1N(pi(s˜)− 
′
)Rc(s˜)
nN
=
k∑
s˜=1
(pi(s˜)− ′)Rc(s˜)
=
k∑
s˜=1
pi(s˜)Rc(s˜)− ′
k∑
s˜=1
Rc(s˜), (A53)
where (a) is from (A43). From (A49) and (A53), it is easy to see that R∗c tends to be Rc while 
′ → 0.
Similarly, the transmission rate R∗p of the private message Wp tends to be Rp while 
′ → 0.
• Let U˜i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) be the random vector with length N for block i and Un = (U˜1, ..., U˜n). Similarly,
Sn = (S˜1, ..., S˜n), V n = (V˜1, ..., V˜n), Xn = (X˜1, ..., X˜n), Y n = (Y˜1, ..., Y˜n) and Zn = (Z˜1, ..., Z˜n). The
specific values of the above random vectors are denoted by lower case letters.
B. Construction of the code-books
Fix the joint probability mass function PUV SS˜XY Z(u, v, s, s˜, x, y, z) satisfying (2.19).
• Construction of UN : Construct k code-books U s˜ of UN for all s˜ ∈ S. In each code-book U s˜, randomly
generate 2Ns˜Rc(s˜) i.i.d. sequences uNs˜ according to the probability mass function PU |S˜(u|s˜), and index these
sequences as uNs˜(i), where 1 ≤ i ≤ 2Ns˜Rc(s˜).
• Construction of V N : Construct k code-books V s˜ of V N for all s˜ ∈ S. In each code-book V s˜, randomly
generate 2Ns˜(Rp(s˜)+Rc(s˜)) i.i.d. sequences vNs˜ according to the probability mass function PV |U,S˜(v|u, s˜). Index
these sequences of the code-book V s˜ as vNs˜(is˜, as˜, bs˜), where 1 ≤ is˜ ≤ 2Ns˜Rc(s˜), as˜ ∈ As˜ = {1, 2, ..., As˜},
bs˜ ∈ Bs˜ = {1, 2, ..., Bs˜},
As˜ = 2
Ns˜[I(V ;Y |U,S,S˜=s˜)−I(V ;Z|U,S,S˜=s˜)]+ , (A54)
and
Bs˜ = 2
Ns˜I(V ;Z|U,S,S˜=s˜). (A55)
From (A51) and (A55), it is easy to see that 2Ns˜Rp,2(s˜) ≤ Bs˜. Thus we partition Bs˜ into 2Ns˜Rp,2(s˜) bins, and
each bin has 2Ns˜(I(V ;Z|U,S,S˜=s˜)−Rp,2(s˜)) elements.
• Construction of XN : For each s˜, the sequence xNs˜ is i.i.d. generated according to a new discrete memoryless
channel (DMC) with transition probability PX|U,V,S˜(x|u, v, s˜). The inputs of this new DMC are uNs˜ and vNs˜ ,
while the output is xNs˜ .
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C. Encoding scheme
The codeword in each block has length N . Let Ls˜ be the number of times during the N symbols for which
the delayed feedback state at the transmitter is S˜ = s˜. Every time that the corresponding delayed state is S˜ = s˜,
the transmitter chooses the next symbols of uN and vN from the component code-books U s˜ and V s˜, respectively.
Since Ls˜ is not necessarily equivalent to Ns˜, an error is declared if Ls˜ < Ns˜, and the codes are filled with zero
if Ls˜ > Ns˜. Since the state process is stationary and ergodic limN→∞ Ls˜N = Pr{S˜ = s˜} in probability. Thus, we
have
Pr{Ls˜ < Ns˜} → 0, as N →∞. (A56)
For the i-th block (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the transmitted message is wi = (wi,1,c, wi,1,p,1, wi,1,p,2, ..., wi,k,c, wi,k,p,1, wi,k,p,2).
The encoding scheme is considered into two steps. First, for block 1 ≤ i ≤ 2d, the encoding scheme is as follows.
• (Choosing u˜i:) In each component code-book U s˜ (1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k), the transmitter chooses u˜Ns˜i (wi,s˜,c) as the
s˜-th component codeword of the transmitted u˜i. The transmitted codeword u˜i is obtained by multiplexing the
different component codewords.
• (Choosing v˜i:) In each component code-book V s˜ (1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k), the transmitter chooses v˜Ns˜i (i∗s˜, a∗s˜, b∗s˜) as the
s˜-th component codeword of the transmitted v˜i, where i∗s˜ = wi,s˜,c, a
∗
s˜ = wi,s˜,p,1, and b
∗
s˜ is randomly chosen
from the bin wi,s˜,p,2 of Bs˜. The transmitted codeword v˜i is obtained by multiplexing the different component
codewords.
Second, for block 2d+ 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the encoding scheme is as follows.
• The choosing of u˜i for block 2d+ 1 ≤ i ≤ n is the same as that in block 1 ≤ i ≤ 2d.
• (Generation of the key:) In block 2d+1 ≤ i ≤ n, the transmitter has already known s˜i−2d, and it is used to mul-
tiplex the component codewords u˜i−d, v˜i−d and vectors s˜i−d, x˜i−d y˜i−d and z˜i−d. Once the transmitter receives
the delayed feedback y˜i−d and s˜i−d, he first demultiplexes them into y˜N1i−d, y˜
N2
i−d,..., y˜
Nk
i−d and s˜
N1
i−d, s˜
N2
i−d,...,s˜
Nk
i−d.
Then, when the transmitter receives y˜Nji−d (1 ≤ j ≤ k), he gives up if y˜Nji−d /∈ TNjY |V,S,S˜(v˜
Nj
i−d, s˜
Nj
i−d, s˜ = j). It
is easy to see that for s˜ = j, the probability for giving up at the i − d-th block tends to 0 as N → ∞ (here
Nj = N(pi(j)− ′)). In the case y˜Nji−d ∈ TNjY |V,S,S˜(v˜
Nj
i−d, s˜
Nj
i−d, s˜ = j), generate a mapping
gi,j : y˜
Nj
i−d → {1, 2, ..., 2NjRf (j)} (A57)
for case 1, and
gi,j : y˜
Nj
i−d → {1, 2, ..., 2NjR
∗
f (j)} (A58)
for case 2. Here note that
Rf (j) = min{H(Y |V,Z, S, S˜ = j), I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜ = j)}, (A59)
R∗f (j) = min{H(Y |V,Z, S, S˜ = j), I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ = j)}. (A60)
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Define a random variable K∗i,j = gi,j(Y˜
Nj
i−d) (2d+ 1 ≤ i ≤ n), which is uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ...,
2NjRf (j)} or {1, 2, ..., 2NjR∗f (j)}, and K∗i,j is independent of U˜i, V˜i, S˜i, X˜i Y˜i, Z˜i and Wi. Here note that
K∗i,j is used as a secret key shared by the transmitter and the receiver, and k
∗
i,j is a specific value of K
∗
i,j .
Reveal the mapping gi,j to the transmitter, receiver and the eavesdropper.
• (Choosing v˜i:) From (A51), (A59) and (A60), it is easy to see that Rp,2(j) ≥ Rf (j) for case 1, and
Rp,2(j) ≥ R∗f (j) for case 2. Thus, for block 2d + 1 ≤ i ≤ n and s˜ = j (1 ≤ j ≤ k), divide the
component message wi,j,p,2 into w∗i,j,p,2 and w
∗∗
i,j,p,2, i.e., wi,j,p,2 = (w
∗
i,j,p,2, w
∗∗
i,j,p,2), where w
∗
i,j,p,2 ∈
{1, 2, ..., 2NjRf (j)}, w∗∗i,j,p,2 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2Nj(Rp,2(j)−Rf (j))} for case 1, and w∗i,j,p,2 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NjR
∗
f (j)},
w∗∗i,j,p,2 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2Nj(Rp,2(j)−R
∗
f (j))} for case 2. For both cases, in each component code-book V s˜ (1 ≤
s˜ ≤ k), the transmitter chooses v˜Ns˜i (i∗s˜, a∗s˜, b∗s˜) as the s˜-th component codeword of the transmitted v˜i, where
i∗s˜ = wi,s˜,c, a
∗
s˜ = wi,s˜,p,1, and b
∗
s˜ is randomly chosen from the bin (w
∗
i,j,p,2 ⊕ k∗i,j , w∗∗i,j,p,2) of Bs˜, where ⊕ is
the modulo addition over {1, 2, ..., 2NjRf (j)} for case 1 and {1, 2, ..., 2NjR∗f (j)} for case 2. Here note that since
K∗i,j and W
∗
i,j,p,2 are independent and uniformly distributed over the same alphabet, K
∗
i,j ⊕W ∗i,j,p,2 is also
independent of K∗i,j and W
∗
i,j,p,2, and it is also uniformly distributed over the same alphabet as that of K
∗
i,j
and W ∗i,j,p,2. The transmitted codeword v˜i is obtained by multiplexing the different component codewords.
D. Decoding scheme
• (Decoding scheme for the receiver:)
– (Decoding the common message wi,c for block 1 ≤ i ≤ n:) The delayed feedback state S˜ at the
transmitter, which is used to multiplex the component codewords, is also available at the receiver. For
block 1 ≤ i ≤ n, once the receiver receives y˜i and the state sequence s˜i, he first demultiplexes them into
outputs corresponding to the component code-books and separately decodes each component codeword.
To be specific, in each code-book U s˜, the receiver has (y˜Ns˜i , s˜Ns˜i ) and tries to search a unique u˜Ns˜i such
that
(u˜Ns˜i , y˜
Ns˜
i , s˜
Ns˜
i ) ∈ TNs˜UY S|S˜(). (A61)
If there exists such a unique u˜Ns˜i , put out the corresponding index wˆi,s˜,c. Otherwise, i.e., if no such
sequence exists or multiple sequences have different message indices, declare a decoding error. If for
all 1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k, there exist unique sequences u˜Ns˜i satisfying (A61), the receiver declares that wˆi,c =
(wˆi,1,c, wˆi,2,c, ..., wˆi,k,c) is sent in block i. Based on the AEP and (A49), it is easy to see that the error
probability Pr{wˆi,s˜,c 6= wi,s˜,c} (1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k) goes to 0.
– (Decoding the private message wi,p for block 1 ≤ i ≤ 2d:) After decoding u˜Ns˜i for all 1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k, in
each component code-book V s˜, the receiver tries to find a unique sequence v˜Ns˜i such that
(v˜Ns˜i , u˜
Ns˜
i , y˜
Ns˜
i , s˜
Ns˜
i ) ∈ TNs˜V UY S|S˜(). (A62)
If there exists such a unique v˜Ns˜i , put out the corresponding indexes iˆ
∗
s˜ , aˆ
∗
s˜ and bˆ
∗
s˜ . Otherwise, i.e., if no
such sequence exists or multiple sequences have different message indices, declare a decoding error. For
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block 1 ≤ i ≤ 2d, after the receiver obtains the index bˆ∗s˜ , he also knows wˆi,s˜,p,2 since it is the index of the
bin which bˆ∗s˜ belongs to. Thus, for 1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k, the receiver has an estimation wˆi,s˜,p of the private message
wi,s˜,p by letting wˆi,s˜,p = (aˆ∗s˜, wˆi,s˜,p,2). If for all 1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k, there exist unique sequences v˜Ns˜i such that
(A62) is satisfied, the receiver declares that wˆi,p = (wˆi,1,p, wˆi,2,p, ..., wˆi,k,p) is sent for block i. Based on
the AEP and Rp(s˜) = I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ = s˜), it is easy to see that the error probability Pr{wˆi,s˜,p 6= wi,s˜,p}
(1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k) goes to 0.
– (Decoding the private message wi,p for block 2d + 1 ≤ i ≤ n:) For block 2d + 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k, after decoding u˜Ns˜i , first, the receiver tries to find a unique sequence v˜Ns˜i satisfying (A62).
If there exists such a unique v˜Ns˜i , put out the corresponding indexes iˆ
∗
s˜ , aˆ
∗
s˜ and bˆ
∗
s˜ . Otherwise, i.e., if
no such sequence exists or multiple sequences have different message indices, declare a decoding error.
After the receiver obtains the index bˆ∗s˜ , he also knows (wˆ
∗
i,s˜,p,2⊕ k∗i,s˜, wˆ∗∗i,s˜,p,2) since it is the index of the
bin which bˆ∗s˜ belongs to. Then, note that the receiver knows the secret key k
∗
i,s˜, and thus he can directly
obtain wˆi,s˜,p,2 = (wˆ∗i,s˜,p,2, wˆ
∗∗
i,s˜,p,2) from (wˆ
∗
i,s˜,p,2 ⊕ k∗i,s˜, wˆ∗∗i,s˜,p,2) and the key k∗i,s˜. Thus for 1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k,
the receiver has an estimation wˆi,s˜,p of the private message wi,s˜,p by letting wˆi,s˜,p = (aˆ∗s˜, wˆi,s˜,p,2). If
for all 1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k, there exist unique sequences v˜Ns˜i such that (A62) is satisfied, the receiver declares
that wˆi,p = (wˆi,1,p, wˆi,2,p, ..., wˆi,k,p) is sent for block 2d + 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Based on the AEP and Rp(s˜) =
I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ = s˜), it is easy to see that the error probability Pr{wˆi,s˜,p 6= wi,s˜,p} (1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k) goes to
0.
• (Decoding scheme for the eavesdropper:)
– (Decoding the common message wi,c for block 1 ≤ i ≤ n:) The delayed feedback state S˜ at the
transmitter, which is used to multiplex the component codewords, is also available at the eavesdropper.
For block 1 ≤ i ≤ n, once the eavesdropper receives z˜i and the state sequence s˜i, he first demultiplexes
them into outputs corresponding to the component code-books and separately decodes each component
codeword. To be specific, in each code-book U s˜, the eavesdropper has (z˜Ns˜i , s˜Ns˜i ) and tries to search a
unique u˜Ns˜i such that
(u˜Ns˜i , z˜
Ns˜
i , s˜
Ns˜
i ) ∈ TNs˜UZS|S˜(). (A63)
If there exists such a unique u˜Ns˜i , put out the corresponding index wˇi,s˜,c. Otherwise, i.e., if no such
sequence exists or multiple sequences have different message indices, declare a decoding error. If for
all 1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k, there exist unique sequences u˜Ns˜i satisfying (A63), the receiver declares that wˇi,c =
(wˇi,1,c, wˇi,2,c, ..., wˇi,k,c) is sent in block i. Based on the AEP and (A49), it is easy to see that the error
probability Pr{wˇi,s˜,c 6= wi,s˜,c} (1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k) goes to 0.
– (For block 1 ≤ i ≤ n, given z˜i, u˜i, s˜i and wi,p,1, decoding v˜i:) In each component code-book V s˜
(1 ≤ s˜ ≤ k), given s˜Ns˜i , u˜Ns˜i (wi,s˜,c), z˜Ns˜i and wi,s˜,p,1, the eavesdropper tries to find a unique bˇ∗s˜ such that
(v˜Ns˜i (wi,s˜,c, wi,s˜,p,1, bˇ
∗
s˜), u˜
Ns˜
i (wi,s˜,c), z˜
Ns˜
i , s˜
Ns˜
i ) ∈ TNs˜UV SZ|S˜(). (A64)
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Since there are 2Ns˜I(V ;Z|U,S,S˜=s˜) possible values of bˇ∗s˜ (see (A55)), based on the AEP, the error probability
Pr{bˇ∗s˜ 6= b∗s˜} → 0. (A65)
– (For block 2d + 1 ≤ i ≤ n, given v˜i−d, z˜i−d and s˜i−d, the eavesdropper’s equivocation about the
secret key:) For block 2d + 1 ≤ i ≤ n and S˜ = s˜, even the eavesdropper knows v˜Ns˜i , without the
secret key k∗i,s˜ he still can not obtain wi,s˜,p,2, and this is because wi,s˜,p,2 = (w
∗
i,s˜,p,2⊕ k∗i,s˜, w∗∗i,s˜,p,2). The
eavesdropper can guess k∗i,s˜ from v˜
Ns˜
i−d, z˜
Ns˜
i−d and s˜
Ns˜
i−d, and his equivocation about the secret key k
∗
i,s˜ can
be bounded by the following balanced coloring lemma introduced by Ahlswede and Cai [42].
Lemma 1: (Balanced coloring lemma) Given S˜ = s˜, for any , δ > 0, sufficiently large Ns˜, all Ns˜-
type PV SS˜Y (v, s, s˜, y) and all v˜
Ns˜
i−d, s˜
Ns˜
i−d ∈ TNs˜V S|S˜ (2d + 1 ≤ i ≤ n), there exists a γ- coloring
c : TNs˜
Y |V,S,S˜(v˜
Ns˜
i−d, s˜
Ns˜
i−d, s˜) → {1, 2, .., γ} of TNs˜Y |V,S,S˜(v˜
Ns˜
i−d, s˜
Ns˜
i−d, s˜) such that for all joint Ns˜-type
PV SS˜Y Z(v, s, s˜, y, z) with marginal distribution PV SS˜Z(v, s, s˜, z) and
|TNs˜
Y |V,S,S˜,Z(v˜
Ns˜
i−d,s˜
Ns˜
i−d,s˜,z˜
Ns˜
i−d)|
γ > 2
Ns˜,
v˜Ns˜i−d, s˜
Ns˜
i−d, z˜
Ns˜
i−d ∈ TNs˜V SZ|S˜ ,
|c−1(k)| ≤
|TNs˜
Y |V,S,S˜,Z(v˜
Ns˜
i−d, s˜
Ns˜
i−d, s˜, z˜
Ns˜
i−d)|(1 + δ)
γ
, (A66)
for k = 1, 2, ..., γ, where c−1 is the inverse image of c.
Proof: See [42, p. 260].
Lemma 1 shows that given S˜ = s˜, if v˜Ns˜i−d, s˜
Ns˜
i−d, y˜
Ns˜
i−d and z˜
Ns˜
i−d are jointly typical, for given v˜
Ns˜
i−d, s˜
Ns˜
i−d
and z˜Ns˜i−d, the number of y˜
Ns˜
i−d ∈ TNs˜Y |V,S,S˜,Z(v˜
Ns˜
i−d, s˜
Ns˜
i−d, s˜, z˜
Ns˜
i−d) for a certain color k (k = 1, 2, ..., γ),
which is denoted as |c−1(k)|, is upper bounded by |T
Ns˜
Y |V,S,S˜,Z(v˜
Ns˜
i−d,s˜
Ns˜
i−d,s˜,z˜
Ns˜
i−d)|(1+δ)
γ . By using Lemma 1,
it is easy to see that the typical set TNs˜
Y |V,S,S˜,Z(v˜
Ns˜
i−d, s˜
Ns˜
i−d, s˜, z˜
Ns˜
i−d) maps into at least
|TNs˜
Y |V,S,S˜,Z(v˜
Ns˜
i−d, s˜
Ns˜
i−d, s˜, z˜
Ns˜
i−d)|
|TNs˜
Y |V,S,S˜,Z(v˜
Ns˜
i−d,s˜
Ns˜
i−d,s˜,z˜
Ns˜
i−d)|(1+δ)
γ
=
γ
1 + δ
(A67)
colors. On the other hand, the typical set TNs˜
Y |V,S,S˜,Z(v˜
Ns˜
i−d, s˜
Ns˜
i−d, s˜, z˜
Ns˜
i−d) maps into at most γ colors. Thus,
given S˜ = s˜, V˜ Ns˜i−d, Z˜
Ns˜
i−d, S˜
Ns˜
i−d, the eavesdropper’s equivocation H(K
∗
i,s˜|V˜ Ns˜i−d, S˜Ns˜i−d, Z˜Ns˜i−d) about the
secret key K∗i,s˜ is lower bounded by
H(K∗i,s˜|V˜ Ns˜i−d, S˜Ns˜i−d, Z˜Ns˜i−d, S˜ = s˜) ≥ log
γ
1 + δ
. (A68)
Here note that in our encoding scheme, γ = 2Ns˜Rf (s˜) for case 1, and γ = 2Ns˜R
∗
f (s˜) for case 2, see (A57)
and (A58). Then, it is easy to see that (A68) can be re-written as follows. For case 1,
H(K∗i,s˜|V˜ Ns˜i−d, S˜Ns˜i−d, Z˜Ns˜i−d, S˜ = s˜) ≥ Ns˜Rf (s˜)− log(1 + δ), (A69)
and for case 2,
H(K∗i,s˜|V˜ Ns˜i−d, S˜Ns˜i−d, Z˜Ns˜i−d, S˜ = s˜) ≥ Ns˜R∗f (s˜)− log(1 + δ). (A70)
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Now it remains to show that Re = I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜) − I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜) + Rf ) for case 1 and Re = R∗f for case
2, see the followings.
E. Equivocation analysis:
Equivocation analysis for case 1: For all blocks, the equivocation ∆ is bounded by
∆ =
1
nN
H(W |Zn, Sn) = 1
nN
H(Wc,Wp|Zn, Sn)
≥ 1
nN
H(Wp|Zn, Sn,Wc) ≥ 1
nN
H(Wp|Zn, Sn,Wc, Un)
(a)
=
1
nN
H(Wp|Zn, Sn, Un) = 1
nN
H(W1,p, ...,Wn,p|Zn, Sn, Un)
=
1
nN
n∑
i=1
H(Wi,p|Zn, Sn, Un,W1,p, ...,Wi−1,p)
=
1
nN
(
2d∑
i=1
H(Wi,p|Zn, Sn, Un,W1,p, ...,Wi−1,p)
+
n∑
i=2d+1
H(Wi,p|Zn, Sn, Un,W1,p, ...,Wi−1,p))
(b)
=
1
nN
(
2d∑
i=1
H(Wi,p|Z˜i, S˜i, U˜i) +
n∑
i=2d+1
H(Wi,p|Z˜i, S˜i, U˜i, Z˜i−d, S˜i−d, U˜i−d))
(c)
≥ 1
nN
n∑
i=2d+1
H(Wi,p|Z˜i, S˜i, U˜i, Z˜i−d, S˜i−d, U˜i−d)
=
1
nN
n∑
i=2d+1
k∑
s˜=1
H(Wi,s˜,p|Wi,1,p, ...,Wi,s˜−1,p, Z˜i, S˜i, U˜i, Z˜i−d, S˜i−d, U˜i−d)
(d)
=
1
nN
n∑
i=2d+1
k∑
s˜=1
H(Wi,s˜,p|Z˜Ns˜i , S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i , Z˜Ns˜i−d, S˜Ns˜i−d, U˜Ns˜i−d)
=
1
nN
n∑
i=2d+1
k∑
s˜=1
H(Wi,s˜,p,1,Wi,s˜,p,2|Z˜Ns˜i , S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i , Z˜Ns˜i−d, S˜Ns˜i−d, U˜Ns˜i−d)
(e)
=
1
nN
n∑
i=2d+1
k∑
s˜=1
(H(Wi,s˜,p,1|Z˜Ns˜i , S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i )
+H(Wi,s˜,p,2|Wi,s˜,p,1, Z˜Ns˜i , S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i , Z˜Ns˜i−d, S˜Ns˜i−d, U˜Ns˜i−d)), (A71)
where (a) is from the definition Wi,p = (Wi,1,p,Wi,2,p, ...,Wi,k,p) (1 ≤ i ≤ n), (b) is from the Markov chains
Wi,p → (Z˜i, S˜i, U˜i) → (W1,p, ...,Wi−1,p, Z˜i−1, Z˜ni+1, U˜ i−1, U˜ni+1, S˜i−1, S˜ni+1) for block 1 ≤ i ≤ 2d, and Wi,p →
(Z˜i, S˜i, U˜i, Z˜i−d, S˜i−d, U˜i−d)→ (W1,p, ...,Wi−1,p, Z˜i−d−1, Z˜i−1i−d+1, Z˜ni+1, U˜ i−d−1, U˜ i−1i−d+1, U˜ni+1, S˜i−d−1, S˜i−1i−d+1, S˜ni+1)
for block 2d + 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (c) is from the fact that when n and N tend to infinity, 1nN
∑2d
i=1H(Wi,p|Z˜i, S˜i, U˜i)
tends to zero, and thus we can drop it, (d) is from the Markov chain Wi,s˜,p → (Z˜Ns˜i , S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i , Z˜Ns˜i−d, S˜Ns˜i−d, U˜Ns˜i−d)→
(Wi,1,p, ...,Wi,s˜−1,p, Z˜N1i , ..., Z˜
Ns˜−1
i , Z˜
Ns˜+1
i , ..., Z˜
Nk
i , U˜
N1
i , ..., U˜
Ns˜−1
i , U˜
Ns˜+1
i , ..., U˜
Nk
i , S˜
N1
i , ..., S˜
Ns˜−1
i , S˜
Ns˜+1
i , ..., S˜
Nk
i ,
Z˜N1i−d, ..., Z˜
Ns˜−1
i−d , Z˜
Ns˜+1
i−d , ..., Z˜
Nk
i−d, U˜
N1
i−d, ..., U˜
Ns˜−1
i−d , U˜
Ns˜+1
i−d , ..., U˜
Nk
i−d, S˜
N1
i−d, ..., S˜
Ns˜−1
i−d , S˜
Ns˜+1
i−d , ..., S˜
Nk
i−d), which implies
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the s˜-th component of the private message Wi,p is only related with the s˜-th component of U˜i, S˜i, Z˜i, U˜i−d, S˜i−d
and Z˜i−d, and (e) is from the Markov chain Wi,s˜,p,1 → (Z˜Ns˜i , S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i )→ (Z˜Ns˜i−d, S˜Ns˜i−d, U˜Ns˜i−d).
Now it remains for us to bound the conditional entropies H(Wi,s˜,p,1|Z˜Ns˜i , S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i ) and H(Wi,s˜,p,2|Wi,s˜,p,1, Z˜Ns˜i ,
S˜Ns˜i , U˜
Ns˜
i , Z˜
Ns˜
i−d, S˜
Ns˜
i−d, U˜
Ns˜
i−d) in (A71), see the followings.
The conditional entropy H(Wi,s˜,p,1|Z˜Ns˜i , S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i ) can be bounded by
H(Wi,s˜,p,1|Z˜Ns˜i , S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i ) ≥ H(Wi,s˜,p,1|Z˜Ns˜i , S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i , S˜ = s˜)
= H(Wi,s˜,p,1, Z˜
Ns˜
i , S˜
Ns˜
i , U˜
Ns˜
i , S˜ = s˜)−H(Z˜Ns˜i , S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i , S˜ = s˜)
= H(V˜ Ns˜i ,Wi,s˜,p,1, Z˜
Ns˜
i , S˜
Ns˜
i , U˜
Ns˜
i , S˜ = s˜)−H(V˜ Ns˜i |Wi,s˜,p,1, Z˜Ns˜i , S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i , S˜ = s˜)−H(Z˜Ns˜i , S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i , S˜ = s˜)
(f)
= H(Z˜Ns˜i |V˜ Ns˜i , S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i , S˜ = s˜) +H(V˜ Ns˜i ,Wi,s˜,p,1, S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i , S˜ = s˜)
−H(V˜ Ns˜i |Wi,s˜,p,1, Z˜Ns˜i , S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i , S˜ = s˜)−H(Z˜Ns˜i , S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i , S˜ = s˜)
(g)
= Ns˜H(Z|V,U, S, S˜ = s˜) +H(V˜ Ns˜i |S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i , S˜ = s˜)−H(Z˜Ns˜i |S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i , S˜ = s˜)
−H(V˜ Ns˜i |Wi,s˜,p,1, Z˜Ns˜i , S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i , S˜ = s˜)
≥ Ns˜H(Z|V,U, S, S˜ = s˜) +H(V˜ Ns˜i |S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i , S˜ = s˜)−Ns˜H(Z|U, S, S˜ = s˜)
−H(V˜ Ns˜i |Wi,s˜,p,1, Z˜Ns˜i , S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i , S˜ = s˜)
(h)
≥ Ns˜I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ = s˜)− 1−Ns˜I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜ = s˜)−H(V˜ Ns˜i |Wi,s˜,p,1, Z˜Ns˜i , S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i , S˜ = s˜)
(i)
≥ Ns˜I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ = s˜)− 1−Ns˜I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜ = s˜)−Ns˜1, (A72)
where (f) is from the fact that H(Wi,s˜,p,1|V˜ Ns˜i ) = 0, (g) is also from H(Wi,s˜,p,1|V˜ Ns˜i ) = 0 and the fact that the
channel is a DMC with transition probability PY,Z|X,S(y, z|x, s), and for each s˜, XNs˜ is i.i.d. generated according
to a new DMC with transition probability PX|U,V,S˜(x|u, v, s˜), thus we have H(Z˜Ns˜i |V˜ Ns˜i , S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i , S˜ = s˜) =
Ns˜H(Z|V,U, S, S˜ = s˜), (h) is from the fact that for given s˜, u˜Ns˜i and s˜Ns˜i , V˜ Ns˜i has As˜ ·Bs˜ possible values, using
a similar lemma in [16], we have
H(V˜ Ns˜i |S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i , S˜ = s˜) ≥ logAs˜ + logBs˜ − 1
(1)
= Ns˜I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ = s˜)− 1, (A73)
where (1) is from (A54) and (A55), and (i) is from the fact that given s˜, wi,s˜,p,1, z˜Ns˜i , s˜
Ns˜
i and u˜
Ns˜
i , the eavesdropper’s
decoding error probability of v˜Ns˜i tends to zero (see (A65)), then, by using Fano’s inequality, we have
1
Ns˜
H(V˜ Ns˜i |Wi,s˜,p,1, Z˜Ns˜i , S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i , S˜ = s˜) ≤ 1, (A74)
where 1 → 0 as Ns˜ →∞.
The conditional entropy H(Wi,s˜,p,2|Wi,s˜,p,1, Z˜Ns˜i , S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i , Z˜Ns˜i−d, S˜Ns˜i−d, U˜Ns˜i−d) can be bounded by
H(Wi,s˜,p,2|Wi,s˜,p,1, Z˜Ns˜i , S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i , Z˜Ns˜i−d, S˜Ns˜i−d, U˜Ns˜i−d)
≥ H(Wi,s˜,p,2|Wi,s˜,p,1, Z˜Ns˜i , S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i , Z˜Ns˜i−d, S˜Ns˜i−d, U˜Ns˜i−d,W ∗i,s˜,p,2 ⊕K∗i,s˜, S˜ = s˜, V˜ Ns˜i , V˜ Ns˜i−d)
(j)
= H(Wi,s˜,p,2|Z˜Ns˜i−d, S˜Ns˜i−d, U˜Ns˜i−d,W ∗i,s˜,p,2 ⊕K∗i,s˜, S˜ = s˜, V˜ Ns˜i−d)
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(k)
= H(Wi,s˜,p,2|Z˜Ns˜i−d, S˜Ns˜i−d,W ∗i,s˜,p,2 ⊕K∗i,s˜, S˜ = s˜, V˜ Ns˜i−d)
= H(K∗i,s˜|Z˜Ns˜i−d, S˜Ns˜i−d,W ∗i,s˜,p,2 ⊕K∗i,s˜, S˜ = s˜, V˜ Ns˜i−d)
(l)
= H(K∗i,s˜|Z˜Ns˜i−d, S˜Ns˜i−d, V˜ Ns˜i−d, S˜ = s˜)
(m)
≥ Ns˜Rf (s˜)− log(1 + δ), (A75)
where (j) is from the Markov chain Wi,s˜,p,2 → (Z˜Ns˜i−d, S˜Ns˜i−d, U˜Ns˜i−d,W ∗i,s˜,p,2⊕K∗i,s˜, S˜ = s˜, V˜ Ns˜i−d)→ (Wi,s˜,p,1, Z˜Ns˜i , S˜Ns˜i ,
U˜Ns˜i , V˜
Ns˜
i ), (k) is from the fact that H(U˜
Ns˜
i−d|V˜ Ns˜i−d) = 0, (l) is from the Markov chain W ∗i,s˜,p,2 ⊕ K∗i,s˜ →
(Z˜Ns˜i−d, S˜
Ns˜
i−d, V˜
Ns˜
i−d, S˜ = s˜)→ K∗i,s˜, and (m) is from (A69).
Substituting (A72) and (A75) into (A71), we have
∆ ≥ 1
nN
n∑
i=2d+1
k∑
s˜=1
[Ns˜I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ = s˜)− 1−Ns˜I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜ = s˜)−Ns˜1 +Ns˜Rf (s˜)− log(1 + δ)]
=
1
nN
n∑
i=2d+1
k∑
s˜=1
[Ns˜(I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ = s˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜ = s˜) +Rf (s˜)− 1)− 1− log(1 + δ)]
(n)
=
1
nN
n∑
i=2d+1
k∑
s˜=1
[N(pi(s˜)− ′)(I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ = s˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜ = s˜) +Rf (s˜)− 1)− 1− log(1 + δ)]
=
n− 2d
nN
k∑
s˜=1
[Npi(s˜)(I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ = s˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜ = s˜) +Rf (s˜))−Npi(s˜)1
−N′(I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ = s˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜ = s˜) +Rf (s˜)) +N′1 − 1− log(1 + δ)]
(o)
= I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜) +Rf − 2d
n
(I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜) +Rf )− n− 2d
n
1
k∑
s˜=1
pi(s˜)
−n− 2d
n

′
k∑
s˜=1
(I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜ = s˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜ = s˜) +Rf (s˜))
+
n− 2d
n
k(
′
1 − 1 + log(1 + δ)
N
), (A76)
where (n) is from (A43), and (o) is from (A59). Thus, choosing sufficiently large n and N (here note that 
′
and
1 tend to zero while N →∞), ∆ ≥ I(V ;Y |U, S, S˜)− I(V ;Z|U, S, S˜) +Rf −  is proved.
Equivocation analysis for case 2: For the case 2, (A47) implies that the private message Wi,p,1 = (Wi,1,p,1, ...,Wi,k,p,1)
of block i is a constant, and thus the conditional entropy H(Wi,s˜,p,1|Z˜Ns˜i , S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i ) of (A71) satisfies
H(Wi,s˜,p,1|Z˜Ns˜i , S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i ) = 0. (A77)
Moreover, using (A70), the last step of (A75) can be re-written by
H(Wi,s˜,p,2|Wi,s˜,p,1, Z˜Ns˜i , S˜Ns˜i , U˜Ns˜i , Z˜Ns˜i−d, S˜Ns˜i−d, U˜Ns˜i−d)
≥ Ns˜R∗f (s˜)− log(1 + δ). (A78)
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Substituting (A77) and (A78) into (A71), we have
∆ ≥ 1
nN
n∑
i=2d+1
k∑
s˜=1
(Ns˜R
∗
f (s˜)− log(1 + δ))
=
1
nN
n∑
i=2d+1
k∑
s˜=1
(N(pi(s˜)− ′)R∗f (s˜)− log(1 + δ))
=
n− 2d
nN
(N
k∑
s˜=1
pi(s˜)R∗f (s˜)−N
′
k∑
s˜=1
R∗f (s˜)− k log(1 + δ))
(1)
=
n− 2d
n
R∗f −
n− 2d
n

′
k∑
s˜=1
R∗f (s˜)−
n− 2d
n
log(1 + δ)
N
k, (A79)
where (1) is from (A60). Thus, choosing sufficiently large n and N (here note that 
′
tends to zero while N →∞),
∆ ≥ R∗f −  is proved.
Thus, the achievability proof of Rfi for both cases are completed. Finally, using Fourier-Motzkin elimination
to eliminate Rc and Rp from Rfi, Rfi is obtained. The proof of Theorem 3 is completed.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Since Re ≤ R is obvious, we only need to prove the inequalities R ≤ I(V ;Y |S, S˜) and Re ≤ H(Y |Z,U, S, S˜).
Define the auxiliary random variables U , V , X , S, S˜, Y and Z the same as those in (A24). Then it is easy to see that
the proof of R ≤ I(V ;Y |S, S˜) is exactly the same as that in (A36). Now it remains to show Re ≤ H(Y |Z,U, S, S˜),
see the followings.
By using (2.9) and (2.10), we have
Re − 
(1)
≤ 1
N
H(W |ZN , SN )
=
1
N
(H(W |ZN , SN )−H(W |ZN , SN , Y N ) +H(W |ZN , SN , Y N ))
(2)
≤ 1
N
I(W ;Y N |ZN , SN ) + δ(Pe)
N
≤ 1
N
H(Y N |ZN , SN ) + δ(Pe)
N
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
H(Yi|Y i−1, ZN , SN ) + δ(Pe)
N
(3)
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
H(Yi|Y i−1, ZNi+1, SN , Zi, Si, Si−d) +
δ(Pe)
N
(4)
= H(Y |U,Z, S, S˜) + δ(Pe)
N
(5)
≤ H(Y |U,Z, S, S˜) + δ()
N
, (A80)
where (1) from (2.10), and (2) is from the Fano’s inequality, (3) is from the fact that Si and Si−d (here Si−d = const
when i ≤ d) are included in SN , (4) is from the definitions in (A24) and the fact that J is a random variable
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(uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., N}), and it is independent of Y N , ZN , W and SN , and (5) is from δ(Pe) is
increasing while Pe is increasing, and Pe ≤ .
Letting → 0, Re ≤ H(Y |Z,U, S, S˜) is proved, and the proof of Theorem 4 is completed.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF (2.21)
A. Achievability proof of (2.21)
Replacing V N by XN , and letting Wc, UN be constants, the achievability of Rfi∗ is along the lines of the proof
of Theorem 3 for case 1, where
Rfi∗ = {(R,Re) : 0 ≤ Re ≤ R,
R ≤ I(X;Y |S, S˜),
Re ≤ I(X;Y |S, S˜)− I(X;Z|S, S˜) +H(Y |X,Z, S, S˜)}.
Here note that since Z is a degraded version of Y ,
I(X;Y |S, S˜)− I(X;Z|S, S˜) +H(Y |X,Z, S, S˜)
= H(X|S, S˜)−H(X|S, S˜, Y )−H(X|S, S˜) +H(X|S, S˜, Z) +H(Y |X,Z, S, S˜)
(1)
= H(X|S, S˜, Z)−H(X|S, S˜, Y, Z) +H(Y |X,Z, S, S˜)
= I(X;Y |S, S˜, Z) +H(Y |X,Z, S, S˜)
= H(Y |S, S˜, Z),
where (1) is from the Markov chain X → (S, S˜, Y ) → Z. Thus, it is easy to see that Rfi∗ = Rf∗, and the
achievability of (2.21) is completed.
B. Converse proof of (2.21)
Since Re ≤ R is obvious and the proof of R ≤ I(X;Y |S, S˜) is exactly the same as that in Appendix C (see
(A36)), it remains to show that Re ≤ H(Y |S, S˜, Z), see the followings.
Note that
Re − 
(1)
≤ H(W |Z
N , SN )
N
=
1
N
(H(W |ZN , SN )−H(W |ZN , SN , Y N ) +H(W |ZN , SN , Y N ))
(2)
≤ 1
N
(I(W ;Y N |ZN , SN ) + δ(Pe))
≤ 1
N
(H(Y N |ZN , SN ) + δ(Pe))
(3)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
H(Yi|Y i−1, ZN , SN , Si, Si−d) + δ(Pe)
N
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≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
H(Yi|Zi, Si, Si−d) + δ(Pe)
N
(4)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
H(Yi|Zi, Si, Si−d, J = i) + δ(Pe)
N
(5)
= H(YJ |ZJ , SJ , SJ−d, J) + δ(Pe)
N
(6)
≤ H(YJ |ZJ , SJ , SJ−d) + δ()
N
(7)
= H(Y |Z, S, S˜) + δ()
N
, (A81)
where (1) is from (2.10), (2) is from Fano’s inequality, (3) is from the fact that Si and Si−d (here Si−d = const
when i ≤ d) are included in SN , (4) and (5) are from the fact that J is a random variable (uniformly distributed
over {1, 2, ..., N}), and it is independent of Y N , ZN , W and SN , (6) is from Pe ≤  and δ(Pe) is increasing while
Pe is increasing, and (7) is from the definitions in (A24).
Letting → 0, Re ≤ H(Y |Z, S, S˜) is proved. The converse and entire proof of (2.21) is completed.
REFERENCES
[1] H. S. Wang and N. Moayeri, “Finite-state markov channel-A useful model for radio communication channels,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol,
vol. 44, pp. 163-171, 1995.
[2] Q. Zhang and S. Kassam, “Finite-state Markov model for Rayleigh fading channels,” IEEE Trans. Commun, vol. 47, no. 11, pp. 1688-1692,
1999.
[3] A. J. Goldsmith and P. P. Varaiya, “Capacity, mutual information, and coding for finite-state Markov channels,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory,
vol. IT-42, pp. 868-886, 1996.
[4] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of Information Theory. New York, NY: Wiley-Interscience, 1991.
[5] T. M. Cover and C. S. K. Leung, “An achievable rate region for the multiple-access channel with feedback,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol.
IT-27, no. 3, pp. 292-298, 1981.
[6] T. M. Cover and A. El Gamal, “Capacity theorems for the relay channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. IT-25, pp. 572-584, 1979.
[7] H. Viswanathan, “Capacity of Markov channels with receiver CSI and delayed feedback,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. IT-45, no. 2, pp.
761-771, 1999.
[8] U. Basher, A. Shirazi and H. H. Permuter, “Capacity region of finite state multiple-access channels with delayed state information at the
Transmitters,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. IT-58, no. 6, pp. 3430-3452, 2012.
[9] J. Chen and T. Berger, “The capacity of finite-state Markov channels with feedback,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. IT-51, pp. 780-789,
2005.
[10] H. H. Permuter and T. Weissman, “Capacity region of the finite-state multiple access channel with and without feedback,” IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory, vol. IT-55, no. 6, 2009.
[11] H. H. Permuter, T. Weissman, and A. J. Goldsmith, “Finite state channels with time-invariant deterministic feedback,” IEEE Trans. Inf.
Theory, vol. IT-55, pp. 644-662, 2009.
[12] G. Como and S. Yu¨ksel, “On the capacity of finite state multiple access channels with asymmetric partial state feedback,” in WiOPT09:
Proc. 7th Int. Conf.Modeling and Optimization inMobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, IEEE Press, Piscataway, NJ, 2009, pp. 589-594.
[13] A. J. Goldsmith and P. P. Varaiya, “Capacity of fading channels with channel side information,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. IT-43, pp.
1986-1992, 1997.
[14] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” The Bell System Technical Journal, vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 1355-1387, 1975.
[15] S. K. Leung-Yan-Cheong, M. E. Hellman, “The Gaussian wire-tap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. IT-24, no. 4, pp. 451-456, July
1978.
45
[16] I. Csisza´r and J. Ko¨rner, “Broadcast channels with confidential messages,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. IT-24, no. 3, pp. 339-348, May
1978.
[17] Y. Liang, H. V. Poor and S. Shamai, “Secure communication over fading channels,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. IT-54, pp. 2470-2492,
2008.
[18] R. Liu, I. Maric, P. Spasojevic and R. D. Yates, “Discrete memoryless interference and broadcast channels with confidential messages:
secrecy rate regions,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. IT-54, no. 6, pp. 2493-2507, Jun. 2008.
[19] J. Xu, Y. Cao, and B. Chen, “Capacity bounds for broadcast channels with confidential messages,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. IT-55,
no. 6, pp. 4529-4542. 2009.
[20] Y. Liang and H. V. Poor, “Multiple-access channels with confidential messages,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. IT-54, no. 3, pp. 976-1002,
Mar. 2008.
[21] E. Tekin and A. Yener, “The Gaussian multiple access wire-tap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. IT-54, no. 12, pp. 5747-5755, Dec.
2008.
[22] E. Tekin and A. Yener, “The general Gaussian multiple access and two-way wire-tap channels: Achievable rates and cooperative jamming,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. IT-54, no. 6, pp. 2735-2751, June 2008.
[23] M. Wiese and H. Boche, “An Achievable Region for the Wiretap Multiple-Access Channel with Common Message,” Proceedings of 2012
IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory, 2012.
[24] M. H. Yassaee and M. R. Aref, “Multiple access wiretap channels with strong secrecy,” Proceedings of IEEE Information Theory Workshop,
2010.
[25] P. Xu, Z. Ding, and X. Dai, “Rate Regions for Multiple Access Channel With Conference and Secrecy Constraints,” IEEE Trans. Inf.
Forensics and Security, vol. 8, no. 12, pp. 1961-1974, 2013.
[26] Z. H. Awan, A. Zaidi and L. Vandendorpe, “Multi-access Channel with Partially Cooperating Encoders and Security Constraints,” IEEE
Trans. Inf. Forensics and Security, Vol. 8, No. 7, pp. 1243-1254, Jul. 2013.
[27] X. Tang, R. Liu, P. Spasojevic´ and H. V. Poor, “Interference assisted secret communication,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. IT-57, no. 5,
pp. 3153-3167, May 2011.
[28] Y. Liang, A. Somekh-Baruch, H. V. Poor, S. Shamai, and S. Verdu, “Capacity of cognitive interference channels with and without secrecy,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. IT-55, pp. 604-619, 2009.
[29] L. Lai and H. El Gamal, “The relay-eavesdropper channel: cooperation for secrecy,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. IT-54, no. 9, pp.
4005-4019, Sep. 2008.
[30] B. Dai and Z. Ma, “Multiple-access relay wiretap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics and Security, vol. 10, no. 9, pp. 1835-1849, Sep.
2015.
[31] Y. Oohama, “Coding for relay channels with confidential messages,” in Proceedings of IEEE Information Theory Workshop, Australia,
2001.
[32] B. Dai, L. Yu and Z. Ma, “Relay broadcast channel with confidential messages,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics and Security, vol. 11, no. 2,
pp. 410-425, 2016.
[33] E. Ekrem and S. Ulukus, “Secrecy in cooperative relay broadcast channels,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. IT-57, pp. 137-155, 2011.
[34] C. Mitrpant, A. J. Han Vinck and Y. Luo, “An Achievable Region for the Gaussian Wiretap Channel with Side Information,” IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory, vol. IT-52, no. 5, pp. 2181-2190, 2006.
[35] Y. Chen, A. J. Han Vinck, “Wiretap channel with side information,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. IT-54, no. 1, pp. 395-402, January 2008.
[36] M. El Halabi, T. Liu, C. N. Georghiades and S. Shamai, “Secret writing on dirty paper: a deterministic view,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory,
vol. IT-58, no. 6, pp. 3419-3429, June 2012.
[37] Y. K. Chia and A. El Gamal, “Wiretap channel with causal state information,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 58, no. 5, pp. 2838-2849,
May 2012.
[38] B. Dai, Z. Ma and X. Fang, “Feedback Enhances the Security of State-Dependent Degraded Broadcast Channels With Confidential
Messages,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics and Security, Vol. 10, No. 7, pp. 1529-1542, 2015.
[39] M. Bloch and J. N. Lanema, “On the secrecy capacity of arbitrary wiretap channels,” in Proc. of 46th Allerton Conference on Communication,
Control and Computing, Monticello, IL, September 2008.
46
[40] Y. Sankarasubramaniam, A. Thangaraj and K. Viswanathan, “Finite-state wiretap channels: secrecy under memory constraints,” in Proc.
2009 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, Taormina, Italy, 2009, pp. 115-119.
[41] M. Mushkin and I. Bar-David, “Capacity and coding for the Gilbert-Elliott channels,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 35, pp. 1277-1290,
1989.
[42] R. Ahlswede and N. Cai, “Transmission, Identification and Common Randomness Capacities for Wire-Tap Channels with Secure Feedback
from the Decoder,” book chapter in General Theory of Information Transfer and Combinatorics, LNCS 4123, pp. 258-275, Berlin: Springer-
Verlag, 2006.
[43] S. Lall, “Advanced topics in computation for control,” Lecture notes for Engr210b, Stanford University, Fall, 2004.
